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One point on which plaintiff's counsel, defense counsel, and the judici-
ary can agree is that the present way we have attempted to resolve
asbestos cases has failed.'
A fundamental debate remains about the suitability of the tort system
for handling the tens of thousands of asbestos cases that remain on
state and federal court dockets. The initial social benefits of tort liti-
gation were impressive .... [b]ut to continue to process claims in the
same fashion as the initial cases were handled despite the extensive
body of experience and epidemiological data now accumulated ap-
pears intolerable as a matter of national policy.2
INTRODUCTION
It has become increasingly apparent in the last few years
that the asbestos crisis facing the judicial system in the United
States has reached epidemic proportions.3 The sheer number of
Judicial Conference of the United States: Report of the Judicial Conference Ad
Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, (March, 1991) (on file with the Brooklyn Law
Review) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Comm. Rep.].
2 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 750.
3 See Stephen Labaton, Business and the Law; Judicial Struggle in Asbestos Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1990, at D2.
Right now, [asbestos] cases are scattered throughout every Federal court and
most state courts around the nation. In some areas, they are badly clogging the
dockets. Asbestos personal-injury cases form the basis for the largest number
of civil disputes around the nation, and some lawyers and scientists predict
that they will increase dramatically in the coming years as injuries from de-
cades of exposure become apparent.
Id.
Asbestos cases fall within a category of litigation that commentators and judges com-
monly refer to as "mass torts." Mass torts are further divided into two types: mass acci-
dents and mass products liability suits. See Andrew C. Rose, Federal Mass Tort Class
Actions: A Step Towards Equity and Efficiency, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1180, 1183 (1983).
Essentially there are two types of mass torts. A mass accident takes place when
persons are injured by a sudden, disastrous occurrence, such as a plane crash.
In contrast, a mass products liability suit is likely to arise when a defectively
designed product is marketed to the general public where it eventually causes
widespread injury.
Id. Asbestos litigation falls within the category of mass products liability suits.
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asbestos cases pending in the courts4 has led to calls for congres-
sional action 'by commentators, district judges,8 circuit court
judges7 and even by a judicial conference chaired by the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.8 Yet despite the
increasingly desperate situation faced by courts," Congress has
consistently failed to adopt a national response to the crisis.Y°
This lack of legislative resolve has left the judiciary in the
unenviable position of attempting to fashion procedural and
substantive measures to respond to the emergency, responses
which are often struck down by higher courts or which later
prove to be unworkable."
4 Recent studies indicate that as many as 100,000 separate asbestos cases are pend-
ing on state and federal dockets across the country. Order to Show Cause, Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, No. 875 (1991).
5 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed
Federal Procedure Act, 64 Tx L. Rav. 1039 (1986); Special Project, An Analysis of the
Legal, Social and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. Rv. 573,
845 (1983).
" See, e.g., Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98
F.R.D. 323, 325 (1983); Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Low's Reac-
tion to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 1, 5 (1986).
7 See Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. Ray. 429
(1986); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1325 (5th Cir. 1985).
'See Ad Hoc Comm. Rep., supra note 1, at n.1. See also Stephen Labaton, Judges
See a Crisis in Heavy Backlog of Asbestos Cases, N.Y. Tims, Mar. 6, 1991, at Al.
The panel, appointed by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to study the role
of the courts in resolving asbestos cases, urges in its report that Congress come
up with a "national solution" to the glut of lawsuits, the delays in settlements
and the depletion of the money available for victims by the large fees of
lawyers.
Id.
, A number of studies indicate that the filing rate of asbestos-related lawsuits is
steadily increasing. Between 1989 and 1990 the number of personal injury lawsuits filed
in connection with asbestos injuries increased by approximately 66%. See Judicial Ad-
min. Office, Asbestos Cases Filed, Terminated and Pending in United States District
Courts (June 30, 1990) (in 1989, 8230 lawsuits were filed compared to 13,687 in 1990); In
re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 812 (F_ & S.D.N.Y.
1991) ("Despite the large number of cases terminated in the last two years and extensive
efforts to increase efficiency and devote substantial resources to asbestos cases, the num-
ber of unresolved cases continues to escalate.").
"0 There have been several bills introduced in Congress addressing the asbestos
problem and proposing solutions. See, e.g., Occupational Disease Health Act of 1935,
H.R. 3090, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Asbestos Workers Recovery Act of 1985, HR.
1626, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). However, as of this date, none of the proposed asbes-
tos relief bills has garnered sufficient support to be enacted into law.
"' See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986) (decertifying a nationwide, mandatory class action on the issue of puni-
tive damages for asbestos property damage claims); In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist.
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One of the most powerful tools that federal courts possess to
alleviate the asbestos problem is the class action suit.12 While
class actions were originally considered to be inappropriate in
mass tort litigation,13 a number of district judges are turning to
them as a potential answer to the "caseload" dilemma. 14 This
was the course adopted by Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the East-
ern District of New York in In re Joint Eastern and Southern
Dist. Asbestos Litig. ("Manville"),'5 a case where the court used
a mandatory class action to reach a settlement preserving the
reorganization plan of the Johns-Manville Corporation.
The use of a class action in Manville, however, raised nu-
merous difficulties. Since the class action was based on diversity
jurisdiction, 6 the court was precluded from applying federal
Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 651-52 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (providing a concise summary
of the original Manville reorganization Plan and the factors that led to its collapse).
12 Class actions in federal courts are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.
13 The reluctance of the judiciary to use class actions in the mass tort context can be
traced to the advisory committee notes, which accompanied the 1966 revisions to Rule
23:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant ques-
tions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an
action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into
multiple lawsuits separately tried.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1966 amendment). While these com-
ments tended to discourage the use of class actions in mass tort cases, they were the
subject of considerable criticism by legal commentators. See Bruce H. Nielson, Was the
1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Fre-
quent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 461 (1988);
David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L. REv. 561 (1987).
14 Class actions enable a court with a heavy asbestos docket to move cases more
quickly, more efficiently and with lower transaction costs. These benefits have led a
number of judges to attempt to use class actions in the asbestos context. See, e.g.,
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (class certification of over
3000 asbestos cases pending in the district as of February 1, 1989); In re School Asbestos
Litig., No. 83-0268 (E.D. Pa. filed Jan. 17, 1983) (nationwide class certification of over
35,000 asbestos property damage claims); In re Ohio Asbestos Litig., OAL Order No. 96
(N.D. Ohio July 16, 1990) (an attempt by Judge Thomas Lambros of the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio to certify a mandatory, nationwide class for asbestos personal injury
claims).
"I In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991).
-0 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) grants original jurisdiction to federal courts in any civil
action where the matter in controversy exceeds $50,000 and the litigants are residents of
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common law to the case and was required to apply the substan-
tive rules of the various states under the Erie doctrine.1 7 Strict
adherence to the Erie doctrine, however, threatened to fragment
the Manville class into separate groups and undermine the
court's purpose in using the class action mechanism. 18
The court's application of Erie and its failure to apply fed-
eral common law also adversely affected the settlement proposed
by the parties as part of the class action proceedings."' This set-
tlement included provisions that sought to apply uniform sub-
stantive rules to all of the class members in direct contravention
of the Erie doctrine.2 Since the substantive laws of the states
varied widely on the issues implicated by these provisions, the
court was forced to undertake an extensive conflicts of law anal-
ysis to determine which state's law applied to the case and if the
settlement was permissible under the applicable law.21 Despite
these and other problems, Judge Weinstein eventually approved
the Settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e),22
basing his decision largely on the urgent need for some type of
final and fiscally sound solution to the flood of asbestos
litigation.23
This Comment will examine the court's opinion in In re
different states. This type of jurisdiction is commonly referred to as "diversity
jurisdiction."
17 Erie ILR. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine requires that a
federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the state in which it is
located, rather than federal common law. While this rule causes little difficulty in the
traditional one-on-one tort case, it became a serious procedural impediment in the
Manville litigation that involved over 130,000 litigants from all fifty states. See infra
notes 164-97 and accompanying text.
28 Because the Manville class included litigants from all fifty states and the substan-
tive laws of the states varied widely on the issues implicated by the case, the court's
adherence to Erie required that it apply different substantive law to the clainm of class
members depending upon in what state their claim originated. See infra notes 156-64
and accompanying text. Therefore the court could not treat all litigants in a uniform
manner. This result, in turn, raised questions about whether the prospective class could
meet the Rule 23(a)(3) prerequisite of typicality. See infra notes 129-33 and accompany-
ing text.
"' Had the court applied federal common law to the case, it would have been free to
disregard the Erie doctrine and fashion a uniform remedy based exclusively on federal
law.
20 See infra note 156.
21 See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 BIL at 869-904. See
also infra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
129 B. at 911.
Id. at 906.
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Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig. as a paradigm
for the management and settlement of asbestos and other mass
tort cases in the mandatory class action context. Part I provides
background information on the cause and effect of the asbestos
crisis. Part II includes the procedural history of the Manville
litigation and examines the court's opinion in the case. Particu-
lar attention is paid to the issues connected with certification of
the class under Rule 23 and the conflicts of law questions that
arose in connection with the proposed settlement. Part III ad-
dresses the policy considerations and practical concerns raised
by a court's use of a mandatory class action in the asbestos con-
text, both as a means to speed the disposition of cases and as a
vehicle to settlement. Part III also proposes specific actions to
minimize the procedural difficulties associated with class actions
in the asbestos context, namely the creation of a federal com-
mon law for mass tort litigation. The Comment concludes that,
in the absence of desperately needed congressional action, the
mandatory class action represents one of the few practical solu-
tions to the asbestos crisis.
I. BACKGROUND: THE ASBESTOS CRISIS
To analyze the court's opinion in Manville, it is vital to un-
derstand the parameters and the urgency of the asbestos crisis.
While asbestos has been used for over 2000 years, its use only
became widespread throughout society during the industrial
revolution.24 In the United States alone asbestos has been widely
used in the building, shipping and construction industries, and
in hundreds of products.25 Asbestos has been used as an insula-
tor around heating and cooling systems, as a noise absorber in
acoustic ceiling tiles and walls, and as an ingredient in construc-
tion cement.28 Asbestos has also been incorporated into such
common products as ironing board covers, stove linings and ta-
ble pads.27 The end result of all this asbestos use has been a
great deal of asbestos exposure. Estimates of the number of
Americans exposed to significant amounts of asbestos range
24 Id. at 735-36; Rubin, supra note 7, at 429.
22 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 736.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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upwards of 21 million.28
Despite the prevalence of asbestos in modem society, its
dangers have been recognized since ancient times. 0 Only in the
twentieth century, however, did the full extent of the danger be-
come apparent to the medical community.30 Starting at the turn
of the century, an increasing number of medical studies began to
link asbestos exposure to various types of illness.31 By the 1930s
the medical and scientific communities had conclusively shown a
cause-and-effect relationship between asbestos and some medi-
cal disorders.32 Yet even with this new evidence, asbestos use
continued to increase in the United States and abroad.3
One of the reasons for this apparently illogical trend was
the lack of economical or readily available substitute materials.-"
The asbestos industry, however, also bears a significant portion
of the blame for the escalating use of asbestos in the early part
of this century. The companies that produced and marketed as-
bestos products, including Johns-Manville, actively suppressed
or edited early studies to protect the profits that they derived
from the material.35 By delaying the release of these medical and
scientific reports, the asbestos industry directly contributed to
the exposure of untold numbers of people throughout the
world.36 By the early 1970s, however, the evidence had become
23 Id.
" Medical problems associated with asbestos date back to the Roman Empire and
the time of Pliny the Elder. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129
B.R. at 735 (citing BLARNEY CASTL1AAN, ASBESMro MEDICAL AND LEGAL AspEars 1 (2d ed.
1986)).
11 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 737.
31 Id.
2 GEORGE A. PETERs & BARnARA J. PmTRS, SoURC0ooK IN AsBEsTos DEE
MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS (1980).
" From 1934 to 1964 the world's use of raw asbestos increased 5007. Irving J. Se-
likoff, M.D. et al., Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, 188 JAMA 22, 142 (1984).
3, In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 736.
-" In 1936, Jobns-Manville, and others, appear to have actively censored the
information disseminated by the Saranac Laboratories, and they continued to
prevent the Saranac scientists from promptly disclosing adverse scientific data.
In the 1930's and 1940's, Saranac Laboratories conducted studies on cancer
and asbestosis funded by the Asbestos Industry for the Study of Tuberculosis.
Again the corporations manufacturing and distributing asbestos exercised edi-
torial control over the publication of these studies.
Id. at 744 (citing B. CASTLEmAkN, A ssT0o MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECT 1 (2d ed.
1986)).
Id. at 739.
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so overwhelmingly persuasive that the federal government was
forced to take steps and passed legislation prohibiting the con-
tinued use of asbestos in most products. 7
Today asbestos has been conclusively linked to a variety of
diseases, including asbestosis, pleural plaques, mesothelioma and
cancer.3 8 These diseases are progressive, incurable and, in a sig-
nificant number of cases, fatal.39 Asbestos-related illnesses fre-
quently exhibit long latency periods, depending upon the extent
of a person's exposure. 40 In general, the greater a person's expo-
sure, the earlier he or she will exhibit signs of asbestos-related
medical problems.41 While earlier cases of asbestos diseases were
predominantly limited to those who mined or worked closely
with the mineral, modern cases have included people living in
proximity to asbestos plants, workers exposed to asbestos only
peripherally in their occupations and even the spouses and chil-
dren of asbestos workers.42
37 Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 739-41 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991). Several types of diseases are caused by breathing airborne asbestos fi-
bers into the lungs. Asbestosis is a disease that attacks and destroys the air sacs in the
lungs, making it more difficult to breathe. It is also progressive and incurable, and may
shorten a person's lifespan. Pleural plaques are a calcification of the tissue surrounding
the lungs. While plaques are the least serious of the asbestos-related diseases, they have
been linked to the onset of more serious types of illnesses. Mesothelioma is an uncom-
mon cell disorder arising in the membranes that enclose the lungs, heart and abdomen.
It is one of the most serious kinds of asbestos illnesses and, once manifested, is usually
fatal within two years. Various types of cancer, such as gastrointestinal cancer and lung
cancer, have also been linked to asbestos exposure. Id.
39 It has been predicted that the eventual death toll from asbestos-related diseases
may exceed 250,000. Id. at 746. Other experts have placed the figure closer to 500,000
deaths. IRVING J. SELIKOFF, M.D., DISABLITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBEsTos-AssocIATED
DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES (1981).
40 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 741.
" Id. ("Appearance of disease correlates with duration and intensity of exposure to
asbestos fibers. The greater the exposure, the sooner the disease can be expected to ap-
pear; conversely, shorter or less intense exposure translates into a longer latency
period.").
42 Id. See Family Wins Settlement in Indirect Asbestos Contamination, U.P.I.
BULL. (May 9, 1991) (family of woman who contracted mesothelioma from inhaling as-
bestos fibers off her father's clothing received a multi-million dollar settlement). Some of
the more unusual asbestos cases have recently arisen in connection with the "Micronite"
filters used in Kent cigarettes between 1952 and 1956. The filters, which were initially
advertised as a new, revolutionary form of health protection for smokers, also, unfortu-
nately, contained an extremely dangerous form of friable asbestos. See Myron Levin,
Smoking's Asbestos Episode, L. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at Al. A number of lawsuits for
asbestos related injuries have ensued against the cigarette maker. Id.
[Vol. 58:553
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During the twentieth century increasing numbers of asbes-
tos victims turned to courts for compensation as the evidence
linking asbestos to medical disorders continued to accumulate.4 3
Initially these cases were unsuccessful. Over time, however, evi-
dence was gathered through the discovery process of the harmful
effects of asbestos and of the industry's foreknowledge of the
danger. Moreover, legal theories evolved." In 1973 a jury award
in connection with an asbestos claim was upheld for the first
time by the Fifth Circuit.45 The race to the courthouse was on.
Over the next eighteen years tens of thousands of cases flooded
the state and federal systems. Estimates of the number of asbes-
tos cases currently pending on state and federal dockets range as
high as 100,000 and recent studies indicate that this number will
probably only increase until the turn of the century. 0
The growing trend of asbestos producers and distributors to
seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection has added further pres-
sure to the problem of overloaded dockets.'7 This shrinking pool
of compensation capital leads, in turn, to incredible inequities in
plaintiffs' recoveries; those who file claims first receive full com-
pensation, while those who delay frequently end up with little or
no compensation. 4' The number of companies involved in asbes-
tos litigation has also increased, as defendants seek to spread
their losses and plaintiffs search for new and previously untap-
ped sources of compensation. 4 Naturally, each new defendant
vigorously resists being pulled into the asbestos nightmare and
43 129 B.R. at 745.
44 Id.
45 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The Borel court allowed an asbestos plaintiff to hold 11 manu-
facturers jointly and severally liable for his injuries. Before this case asbestos plaintiffs
had extreme difficulty succeeding in the tort system because they could not prove which
specific asbestos manufacturer was responsible for their injuries.
4" See supra note 4.
4 Twelve out of the 25 major past manufacturers of asbestos have already declared
bankruptcy due to liability in connection with asbestos claims. See Ad Hoc Comm. Rep.,
supra note 1, at 14.
48 An example of this danger is evident in Manville where those plaintiffs who set-
tled claims or obtained judgments before the company's 1982 bankruptcy filing received
full compensation for their injuries. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig.,
129 BR. at 751 (at the time of its bankruptcy filing, Johns.Manville had already satis-
fied 3570 claims against it). In contrast, those asbestos victims who filed later or have yet
to bring claims will only receive a portion of the value of their claims over an extended
period of time.
49 Id. at 747.
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frequently adopts the defensive posture of litigating each and
every case on an individual basis.50 This philosophy among de-
fendants and the common belief among plaintiffs that they can
receive a larger award in an individual trial or settlement has
only contributed to the burdens placed upon courts.
Asbestos litigation has also proven to be prohibitively ex-
pensive. Recent studies indicate that asbestos victims receive
only about thirty-nine cents out of every dollar spent in connec-
tion with asbestos litigation.51 Most of the money is consumed
by transaction costs, such as attorneys' fees, court costs, insur-
ance premiums and administrative expenses.52 In addition,
plaintiffs frequently face incredibly long delays in receiving their
just compensation. While the majority of cases settle before
trial,53 most defendants will not even enter settlement negotia-
tions until a plaintiff possesses a trial date. Because courts are so
backlogged with asbestos cases, the fact is that many asbestos
victims will die before receiving any compensation at all.
The fundamental debate that has raged over asbestos litiga-
tion is essentially one of idealism versus pragmatism. In a per-
fect world each and every asbestos victim would be entitled to
his or her day in court and would receive full compensation for
any injury. 4 In reality, however, courts simply cannot cope with
asbestos litigation on an individual adjudicatory basis. In addi-
tion, the pool of capital available to compensate present and fu-
ture plaintiffs frequently turns out to be exhausted before they
50 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (E.D. Tex. 1990) ("Defend-
ants assert a right to individual trials in each case and assert the right to repeatedly
contest in each case every contestable issue involving the same products, the same warn-
ings, and the same conduct.").
51 JAMES S. KAKALIK gT AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION, COMPENSATION AND
EXPENSES 91 (1984). However, the Manville court believed that this figure overstated the
amount of compensation victims actually received and placed the correct figure around
thirty cents out of every dollar. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129
B.R. at 749.
52 Id.
11 Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedures In Asbes-
tos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475, 551 (1991) (noting that 79% of all
asbestos litigation through 1989 has been resolved through settlement).
" For articles arguing that mass tort plaintiffs deserve their own day in court de-
spite the difficulty of individual adjudication, see Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in
Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 69 [hereinafter Mass Trials]; Roger H.
Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779
(1985) [hereinafter Mass Tort Joinder].
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even get into the courthouse.55 When one considers the caseload
dilemma, the bankruptcy filings, the transaction costs and the
delays in compensating plaintiffs, the failure of the individual
lawsuit model to deal adequately with the asbestos crisis is
apparent.5s
Recently the judiciary has taken aggressive steps to con-
front the crisis on its own. Courts have begun to make extensive
use of special masters and court-appointed experts to speed the
resolution of cases.57 Consolidation of large numbers of cases for
trial has also been successful in some asbestos litigation. 3 In ad-
dition, judges have begun to overcome their reluctance to use
class actions in the mass tort context and have certified a num-
ber of asbestos cases for class action treatment."" The most
In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 907-8.
"One point on which plaintiffs counsel, defense counsel and the judiciary can
agree is that the present way we have attempted to resolve asbestos cases has failed." Ad
Hoc Comm. Rep., supra note 1, at 7.
7 Federal courts are empowered to appoint special masters with or without the par-
ties' consent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53. In the past special masters were
predominantly used to perform managerial tasks, such as accountings and damage calcu-
lations. See Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judici-
ary or Reshaping Adjudication, 53 U. Cm. L Rnv. 394, 395-96 (1986). Recently some
courts have expanded the duties of special masters to include gathering data to deter-
mine liability and negotiating settlements among the parties. Id. at 398.
Court-appointed expert witnesses, authorized by Federal Rule of Evidence 706, are
used by federal courts to assist in accumulating and interpreting complex scientific and
technological information. See Mullenix, supra note 53, at 545.
Both types of court personnel were used by Judge Weinstein in Manville. In re Joint
Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 763-64.
"8 See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 (ED. Tex. 1990) (consoli-
dating a number of asbestos cases for trial on common issues); In re Joint Eastern &
Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 748 (listing various cases consolidated in New
York).
Consolidation is authorized by Federal Rule Civil Procedure 42(a), which provides
that where multiple actions before a district court involve common questions of law or
fact, the cases can be consolidated at the court's discretion for trial. Consolidation typi-
cally entails trying all the related cases together, each case, however, retains its own
separate identity. Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy, Mass Exposure
Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. Cm. L. Ray. 467, 503 (1985).
While courts are given wide discretion under the rule as to when to order consolidation,
the procedure is limited to cases pending in the same district, thereby limiting the effec-
tiveness of consolidation in the mass tort context. Id. at 499-500.
59 See supra note 14. A number of district judges led by Judge Robert E. Parker of
the Eastern District of Texas and Judge Thomas Lambros of the Northern District of
Ohio have even attempted to certify a mandatory class action consisting of all personal
injury asbestos cases currently pending in the state and federal courts. See In re Ohio
Asbestos Litig., OAL Order No. 96 (N.D. Ohio, July 16, 1990). Unfortunately, these at-
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promising step, however, recently came from the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation."0 On July 29, 1991 it transferred all
federal asbestos cases involving personal injury or wrongful
death claims to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for consoli-
dated pretrial proceedings.61 While the Panel's order does not
extend to the thousands of asbestos cases pending in state courts
or allow the transferee court to consolidate federal cases for
trial, it represents the strongest action to date by the judiciary
to respond to the asbestos crisis.6 2
tempts proved unsuccessful. See Christopher M. Placitella, Paying the Price of Case
Management Complacency, N.J. L.J., Apr. 25, 1991, at 11 (describing the criticism that
Judge Parker and Judge Lambros have received as a result of their attempts to solve the
asbestos crisis through a nationwide, mandatory class action).
60 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consists of seven circuit and dis-
trict court judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
1407(d) (1968).
61 In re Asbestos Products Liability Litig. (No, VI), 771 F. Supp. 451 (J.P.M.L.
1991). The Panel's order, which affected 26,639 pending asbestos cases, was made under
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). It provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pend-
ing in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made
by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon
its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the conve-
nience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct
of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at
or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which
it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated ....
Id.
The Panel had previously denied transfer under the statute on five separate occa-
sions since first considering such action in 1977. See How To End A Long Legal War,
LA TumEs, Aug. 3, 1991, at B5 (editorial) [hereinafter Legal War]. By reversing itself,
the Panel acknowledged the growing urgency of the asbestos crisis and signalled a new
judicial resolve to find some type of comprehensive solution to the asbestos problem. Id.
Under section 1407(a) the transfer of cases to a single district is solely for the pur-
pose of consolidated pretrial proceedings, such as discovery and pretrial motions, after
which the cases are supposed to be remanded to their original jurisdictions for trial.
Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 58, at 509-10. In actuality, however, most cases are either
settled or disposed of by the transferee court. Id. at 509 n.315. As of June 30, 1983 a
total of 12,154 cases had been consolidated under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Of that number, only
2187 cases had been remanded to their original courts at the close of pretrial proceed-
ings. Id.
The greatest advantage that a transfer by the Multidistrict Panel enjoys over the
consolidation procedures under Rule 42(a) is that the Panel can consolidate all federal
cases involving common questions, while Rule 42(a) is limited to such similar cases pend-
ing in a single district.
'2 For articles discussing the Judicial Panel's order, see Stephen Labaton, Judge's
Panel, Seeing Court Crisis, Combines 26,000 Asbestos Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1991,
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IL IN RE JOINT EASTERN AND SOUTHERN DISTRICT ASBESTOS
LITIGATION
A. Facts and Procedural History
The Johns-Manville Corporation was once the world's lead-
ing producer of asbestos products6 3 and a member of the "For-
tune 500.''64 In 1982, however, the company filed a voluntary pe-
tition for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code.6 5 The impetus behind the Johns-
Manville filing was the potentially unlimited liability the com-
pany faced due to asbestos-related lawsuits.60 The ensuing bank-
ruptcy proceedings have been described as the most complex
ever attempted under Chapter 11.67 In 1986, after extensive ne-
gotiations among the parties and the bankruptcy court, Johns-
Manville proposed the Second Amended and Restated Plan of
Reorganization ("the Plan" or "the Reorganization Plan").66 The
Plan was eventually approved by a majority of the creditors and
the court after hearings, and following exhaustion of appeals, be-
came operational on November 28, 1988.69 In addition, the court
simultaneously entered permanent injunctions to protect the
company from any existing and future lawsuits.7 0
The central provision of the Plan was the establishment of
two "evergreen" trusts that would assume all the asbestos liabil-
ities of the reorganized and renamed Manville Corporation.7 1
at Al; Legal War, supra note 61, at B5.
See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 97 B.L 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
"Id.
Johns-Manville filed for Chapter 11 protection on August 26, 1982. See In re
Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 651 (. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
"Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988). At the time of its
bankruptcy filing Johns-Manville faced approximately 17,000 personal injury lawsuits,
having already settled or tried 3570 suits at an average cost of $20,000 each. In re Joint
Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 751 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
'7In re Johns-Manville Corp., 78 B.R. 407, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 97 B.R. at 176.
"In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 120 BIR at 651.
9 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 198), fld, 78
B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd sub nom., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636
(2d Cir. 1988).
70 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 624-28. The injunctions were issued by
the bankruptcy court in response to motions made by the reorganized Manville Corpora-
tion. Id.
1 Id. at 621. The Asbestos Health Trust ("AH Trust") was the entity established to
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The parties hoped that by channeling all of the asbestos claims
to the trusts and protecting the reorganized debtor, the trusts
would be assured of a continued source of financial support for
as long as needed. 2 The Reorganization Plan, however, was pre-
mised upon estimates of a limited number of future lawsuits, es-
timates that have, over time, proven to be grossly optimistic. 73
Despite a significant amount of initial financing and provisions
for continued financial contributions from the reorganized
debtor, the Asbestos Health Trust ("AH Trust"), responsible for
paying all personal injury claims, was running out of money
within eighteen months of commencing operations.7 4 Within six
months the Property Damage Trust had also became insolvent.7
The instant case arose out of the insolvency of the AH
Trust that had come to the attention of the Eastern and South-
ern District Courts of New York involved in the Brooklyn Navy
resolve all claims involving personal injury by victims of asbestos-related diseases. Id.
The assets of the Trust included $869 million from insurance and assignables, two bonds
executed by the reorganized Manville Corporation in the face amount of $1.8 billion and
an installment note executed by Manville for $50 million. In re Joint Eastern & South-
ern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 752. The AH Trust also became the largest stock-
holder in the reorganized company with 50% of the outstanding common stock and pre-
ferred stock that was convertible to an additional 30% of the common stock. Id. Finally,
the Trust could draw upon 20% of Manville's profits beginning in 1992 and continuing
for as long as necessary to satisfy claims against it. Id. at 753.
The Property Damage Trust ("PD Trust") was a similar mechanism established to
liquidate all asbestos-related property damage claims. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68
B.R. at 622. This Trust was initially funded with $125 million and would receive any of
the AH Trust's remaining assets upon its termination. Id.
71 The Plan envisioned that the trusts would be able, over time, to liquidate fully all
asbestos claims against Johns-Manville. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 129 B.R. at 752.
71 The AH Trust originally estimated that it would face a total of approximately
35,000 claims. Id. at 755. By the time the Reorganization Plan was filed, however, projec-
tions of future lawsuits had increased to between 83,000 and 100,000. Id. Even this revi-
sion has proven to be optimistic. By March 31, 1990 the Trust had received 143,000
claims and by February 5, 1991 that number had soared to over 170,000. Id. at 758.
7' See supra note 71. The inaccurate estimates of future lawsuits was not the only
fatal flaw in the original Plan regarding the AH Trust. The Reorganization Plan also
allowed the AH Trust to be impleaded into any ongoing asbestos litigation. Codefend-
ants, who were responsible for Manville's share of the industry's liability during its six
years in bankruptcy, quickly impleaded the Trust into numerous lawsuits as a codefend-
ant. As a result the Trust found itself a party to thousands of new cases almost over-
night. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 755. In addition,
the Trust's personnel frequently settled lawsuits for $10,000 to $15,000 more than the
original bankruptcy plan had envisioned. Id. at 757-58.
76 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 920 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1990) (approving a "tempo-
rary" 30-year suspension of payments by the Manville PD Trust).
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Yard asbestos cases in the spring of 1990.7' The district courts,
together with the New York State courts involved in the Navy
Yard actions, requested that the AH Trust make its financial
condition known.7 What the courts soon discovered was that
the Trust was deeply insolvent. Based on that information the
combined district courts issued a temporary stay on payments
by the Trust pending revisions of the Plan.7 8 On July 20, 1990
Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York
was appointed to supervise the combined courts' handling of the
Plan.79
One of Judge Weinstein's first acts was to direct the AH
Trust to consider alternative payment procedures and refinanc-
ing possibilities.8 0 In response, on September 19, 1990 the Trust
filed a motion requesting that it be declared a limited fund
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.81 The court appointed a special master to investigate the
1 See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 BJ.R at 762. The
district courts first became aware of the Trust's financial condition in the Brooklyn Navy
Yard asbestos cases when the Trust was unable to enter into meaningful settlement ne-
gotiations. Id.
7 Id.
71 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., NYAL BNY Index No. 4000
(E. & S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1990) (order granting preliminary injunction). The stay was ap-
parently issued as part of the proceedings in the Brooklyn Navy Yard cases. In re Joint
Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 762.
"' See Order of James L. Oakes, Chief Judge, Second Circuit, dated July 20, 1990;
Order of Charles L. Brieant, Chief Judge, United States District Court, Southern District
of New York, dated July 20, 1990.
The jurisdictional basis for consolidating the Manville proceedings before Judge
Weinstein is somewhat complicated. Under article X of Manville's 1988 Reorganization
Plan, the bankruptcy court had continuing jurisdiction over the implementation of the
Plan. 28 U.S.C. section 157(d) permits the withdrawal or referral of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, in whole or part, to a district court if resolution of the proceeding requires the
consideration of other laws aside from title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On July 20, 1990
a partial withdrawal under section 157(d) occurred, allowing Judge Weinstein to take
control of all proceedings involving the AH Trust. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist.
Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 762.
80 Id. at 763. Judge Weinstein also recognized the imperative need for accurate data
on the number of future lawsuits that the Trust could expect to face. Without this infor-
mation any scheme that the court and creditors implemented would face the same uncer-
tainty as the original bankruptcy plan. To facilitate the collection of this data, the court
appointed Brooklyn Law School Professor Margaret Berger as a court expert under Rule
706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. Professor Berger's duties included reporting to
the court on the feasibility of obtaining accurate projections and asisting the court in
selecting a group of experts to provide the necessary information. Id.
11 Id. at 764. A limited fund exists where claims are made by numerous persons
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Trust's motion and to hold hearings on the matter.82 The special
master's conclusion, based on four days of hearings in which a
large number of interested parties participated, 3 was that there
was "a substantial probability that the award of damages to ear-
lier litigants [would] exhaust the Trust's available and projected
assets."84
Intense negotiations among the parties ensued and plaintiffs
filed a class action complaint against the trustees of the AH
Trust on November 19, 1990.8 The complaint sought to revise
the Trust's obligations and payment procedures under the origi-
nal bankruptcy Plan.86 On the same day plaintiffs' representa-
tive counsel submitted a proposed settlement ("Settlement") of
against a fund that is insufficient to satisfy all claims. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory
committee's notes. The rationale behind the Trust's motion for limited fund certification
is not discussed in the opinion. However, it should be noted that most proposed class
actions settle before the class is certified. J. Spencer Schuster, Precertification Settle-
ment of Class Actions: Will California Follow the Federal Lead?, 40 HASrINos L.J. 863,
863 n.1 (1989). It is safe to assume that the Trust hoped to encourage the divergent
parties involved in the Manville litigation to enter into meaningful settlement
negotiations.
82 The court appointed the Honorable Marvin E. Frankel to hold hearings on the
limited fund issue. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 764.
'3 The parties involved in the Manville litigation included individuals with personal
injury claims, other asbestos manufacturers that had contribution claims against
Manville, and distributors and users of Manville products that had indemnification
claims. See infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
8, In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 661 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1990). The special master based his conclusion on the finding that the Trust
had assets of $2.1 to $2.7 billion while facing liabilities of approximately $6.5 billion. Id.
at 667-68.
85 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 767.
a' Id. Ordinarily a court must comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b) to modify a con-
firmed plan of reorganization. Section 1127(b) provides:
The proponent of a plan or the reorganized debtor may modify such plan at
any time after confirmation of the plan and before substantial consummation
of such plan, but may not modify such plan so that such plan as modified fails
to meet the requirements of sections 1122 and 1123 of this title. Such plan as
modified under this subsection becomes the plan only if circumstances warrant
such modification and the court, after notice and a hearing, confirms such plan
as modified, under section 1129 of the title.
11 U.S.C. § 1127(b) (1978). Judge Weinstein avoided the procedural difficulties imposed
by section 1127(b) by holding that the class action Settlement did not constitute a modi-
fication of Manville's original Plan of reorganization. In re Joint Eastern & Southern
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R at 840-42. Instead the court interpreted the Settlement as
only modifying "plan-related documents" such as the original Trust Agreement and it
held that such plan-related documents were not subject to section 1127(b) limitations.
Id.
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the class action.8 7
The Settlement completely revised the operational and pay-
ment procedures to be used by the AH Trust. First, the original
payment plan was replaced by one that gave priority to the most
seriously injured plaintiffs.8 Second, separate provisions were
made to insure that sufficient compensation existed for future
claimants." Third, the Settlement changed the litigation rela-
tionship among the parties by treating all claimants as plaintiffs
under the new payment plan.90 Finally, the Settlement required
that the Manville Corporation take steps to provide immediate
financial aid to the cash-poor AH Trust.91 While the revisions to
the Trust's procedures were extensive, the single most important
aspect of the Settlement was the fact that it removed the Trust
from the tort system.92 To facilitate this removal, section H of
$' Id. at 767. The fact that a settlement of the class action was submitted on the
same day as the complaint would seem to indicate that the parties and the court never
intended the Manville case to proceed as a class action. This view is further supported
by the fact that the proposed Settlement mandated discontinuance of the class action
with prejudice upon a court finding that the Settlement complied with the fairness re-
quirements of Rule 23(e).
The AH Trust's original payment plan was based on the date that a person or
corporation filed a claim with the Trust. Claims were procesed and paid according to
the order in which they were made. This first-in, first-out ("FIFO") payment plan con-
tributed to the Trust's insolvency by encouraging all possible claimants to file as early as
possible.
The revised payment plan established average and maximum values for different
types of asbestos-related diseases. In addition, the new plan provided that the most seri-
ously injured victims would be compensated first up to 45% of the value of their claim.
Once that objective was reached, the Trust would pay the remaining claimants until they
had received 45% of the value of their claims. Codefendants and third party defendants,
who had paid a plaintiff's claim in full and sought either contribution or indemnification
from the Trust, would be assigned the same priority in the distribution system that the
compensated plaintiff would have been entitled to if he or she had brought a claim di-
rectly against the Trust. See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129
B.R. 710, 768-69 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). Upon achieving a universal payment of 45% of all
claims, the remaining claims would be paid on a pro rata basis over time. Id.
89 An entirely separate fund was established to handle the Trust's liability to claim-
ants who had not yet developed any type of asbestos-related disease. The purpose of this
mechanism was to insure that the Trust would not expend all of its limited assets on
present claimants, thereby depriving future claimants of any compensation at all. Id.
90 While the Manville class was composed of personal injury plaintiffs, codefendants
and third party defendants, the court chose to treat them all as plaintiffs for the purpose
of the class action. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
91 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 770.
92 While resort to the tort system was not expressly prohibited, sufficient disincen-
tives were built into the Settlement. Accordingly, although claimants retained the right
to sue in either federal or state court, any judgment in excess of the maximum value
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the Settlement 3 included certain provisions that altered the
rights of the parties under state law. 4
On November 23, 1990 Judge Weinstein heard arguments
on the class action complaint and conditionally certified the
class.95 The court also appointed the named plaintiffs as class
representatives and selected five attorneys from the asbestos
plaintiffs' bar to act as class counsel.96 Simultaneously, the court
enjoined all proceedings nationwide against the Trust and ap-
proved a form of notice.97 Following the court's conditional certi-
fication, fairness hearings were held throughout the country to
respond to objections to the class action. On February 13, 1991,
after hearing additional oral arguments, the court entered final
orders certifying a non-opt-out class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 8
and enjoining the AH Trust from making any payments, except
those for hardship reasons, until a final resolution of the
litigation.99
On June 27, 1991 Judge Weinstein, acting for the combined
district courts, entered a final judgment in the case. The court
assigned by the Settlement to that type of disease, see supra note 88, would only be paid
after all other claimants had received their full compensation. In re Joint Eastern &
Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 770.
9' See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
" In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 773-74. The
court's conditional decision to certify the class was made under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(1), which provides: "As soon as practicable after the commencement of
an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be
so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered
or amended before a decision on the merits." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
"e In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 774. Separate
class counsel was appointed for codefendants upon their motion. Id. at 823.
97 Id. at 774. Individual notice was sent to all known claimant and codefendant
counsel and to all federal or state courts involved in any manner in the Manville litiga-
tion. Id. Notice was also published in a number of national and regional newspapers. Id.
at 775.
" Traditionally, class actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) do not allow
class members to opt out of the class action. See Deborah Deitsch-Perez, Mechanical &
Constitutional Problems In The Certification of Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort Class
Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BRooK. L. REV. 517, 529-30 (1983). In contrast, class actions
under Rule 23(b)(3) allow prospective class members to opt out of the class action and
pursue their claims individually. Id. Moreover, in optional class actions notice must be
provided on an individual basis to each prospective member of the class, while
mandatory class actions give courts greater discretion to approve alternative forms of
notice. Id.
" In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 776.
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order approved the proposed Settlement under Rule 23(e) and
extended all previous stays relating to the class action.
B. The District Court's Opinion
Any analysis of the court's opinion in Manville must begin
with the AH Trust's condition on July 20, 1990.100 On that date
the Trust was already deeply insolvent and faced a large number
of unsettled claims. 101 Furthermore, the situation was deteriorat-
ing at an alarming rate as the Trust's financial condition became
more acute. 102 It was obvious to the parties and the court that
something radical had to be done to preserve the Trust and the
pool of compensation capital it represented for hundreds of
thousands of plaintiffs.103 The difficulty was to decide exactly
what to do and then to obtain the agreement of over 130,000
individual litigants to the solution.
The parties and the court eventually settled on the use of a
mandatory class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).1' This approach
enabled the court to deal with the parties on a representative,
rather than an individual, basis. This benefit, in itself, was a sig-
nificant step in reducing the Manville litigation to a manageable
level. The critical aspect of the Manville class action, however,
100 This is the date that Judge Weinstein was appointed to oversee the Manville
proceedings. See supra note 79.
101 See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. at 661-68
(special master's report on the Trust's grave financial condition).
102 The sociology of the courts, long urged and habituated to dispose promptly
of pending cases, increased disposition rates. Moreover, the courts themselves
had developed efficient methods of discovery, docket control, multiple trials,
use of special masters and the like that provided great potential for com-
pounding the crisis. In this Alice in Wonderland world, they were running
faster and faster yet moving backward, while codefendants were being carried
along towards bankruptcy. As a result of escalating litigation and court pres-
sures, the Trust's rapidly dwindling assets were increasingly consumed by
transaction costs.
In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 762.
103 Id.
104 Admittedly, Manville was ripe for a class action resolution. While the injuries
suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos products were themselves medically complex,
asbestos cases had by this time become relatively routine product liability litigations. Id.
at 746. Furthermore, it is illogical to allow individual cases to proceed independently
when each case essentially repeats the same evidence and legal theories. Id. at 818. Fi-
nally, the Trust could not afford to attempt to resolve each and every case on an individ-
ual basis. The transaction costs associated with such a process were just too high. Id. at
750.
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was that none of the parties could opt out of the proceedings' 05
and thus any resolution reached in this single litigation would
bind all parties. While the class action did allow the court to
reach a final settlement of the case that bound all the parties, it
also raised a myriad of procedural difficulties.110 One of the more
difficult of these procedural problems was whether the litigation
could even qualify as a class action under Rule 23.
1. The Class Action Mechanism
To qualify for class action treatment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, a prospective class must meet the four pre-
requisites of subsection (a) of the rule: numerosity, commonal-
ity, typicality and adequate representation. 0 7 In addition, the
party seeking class certification must show that the case quali-
fies as one of the four types of actions maintainable as class ac-
tions. 08 It is only when all of these standards are met that a
See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
100 Some of the other procedural issues raised by the use of a mandatory class action
included whether the court had personal jurisdiction over absent parties, whether the
class met the requirements for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1332 and
whether the class action proceedings violated the Anti-Injunction Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
15 (1992).
107 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative par-
ties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
"I Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or im-
pede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
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court is justified in handling the case in a representative
manner.
a. The Manville Class
Part of the court's difficulty in treating Manville as a class
action was the size and composition of the proposed class.
Manville involved over 130,000 litigants from all fifty states.'"
The dimensions of the class alone presented the court with a
case management nightmare. Such a large number of litigants,
however, is quite common among mass tort cases. The unique
characteristic of the Manville class was not its size, but rather
its composition.
The class action complaint and the Settlement defined the
class as "all Beneficiaries of the Trust.1 120 The beneficiaries,
however, included a wide range of parties. The majority of-class
members were plaintiffs with personal injury claims; however,
additional members of the class included other asbestos produc-
ers ("codefendants"), distributors of asbestos products ("third
party defendants") and shipowners who used asbestos in their
vessels ("third party defendants").""' Since the plaintiffs in
Manville frequently had claims against comembers of the class
in other litigation, each group had different and sometimes con-
flicting goals in Manville.1 2 Despite these internal class divi-
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.
FED. 1R Civ. P. 23(b).
'09 As of April 1, 1991 the Trust had 136,000 claims pending against it. In addition,
11,300 claims had been settled, but remained unpaid as of that date. In re Joint Eastern
& Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R at 771.
110 See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 120 B. 648, 669 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1990).
"' These "other" members of the Manville class had different claims from the
plaintiffs. The codefendants, who were considered joint tortfeasors under the doctrine of
joint and several liability, had contribution claims against the Trust, while the distribu-
tors and shipowners had a mix of warranty, guarantee and indemnification claims. In
addition, several of the distributors had reached separate settlements with the Trust
during the bankruptcy proceedings and sought to protect these agreements in the class
action proceedings. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbesto3 Litig., 129 B-R. at
784-87.
2 The Manville plaintiffs sought to maximize their recovery from the Trust, the
codefendants and third party defendants. Since the Trust's assets were limited and fi-
nite, the only way to achieve this result was to shift as much of the Trust's liability as
possible to the codefendants, distributors and shipowners. These parties naturally op-
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sions, the court chose to treat the beneficiaries as a single
group.11 This approach prevented the fragmentation of the class
and promoted a uniform resolution of the case.
b. Future Claimants
Because of the long latency period of asbestos-related dis-
eases, the parties and the court in Manville also had to confront
an undeternined number of future claims that would be made
against the Trust.1 4 The class action complaint and Settlement
sought to address this complication by including these "future
claimants" in the Manville class. 5 The United States Supreme
Court, however, has held that absent parties cannot be bound by
a judgment unless it is adequately represented by someone who
posed this effort to shift liability. Their primary objective was to limit or reduce their
own liability by shifting as much of it as possible to the Trust. Each side pursued its own
interests throughout the Manville proceedings, frequently at the expense of the other.
Accordingly, the Manville case was not a typical class action where each party shared
similar interests and worked towards a common goal. In actuality the class never oper-
ated as a unified group, but rather as separate, discrete interest groups each intent on
furthering their own goals.
n' Although the issue was not addressed in Judge Weinstein's opinion, the court
could have treated the codefendants and third party defendants as separate subclasses
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4), which provides: "When appropriate (A)
an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular is-
sues, or (B) a class my be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class,
and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
By utilizing subclasses based on the litigation posture of the claimant, the court
could have avoided the conflicting interests that characterized the single Manville class.
The difficulty with this approach is that it would have prevented the uniform treatment
of all claimants and would have further complicated already extremely complex
litigation.
The court could have also subdivided the Manville class on the basis of the state law
applicable to each claim. This would have effectively removed the conflicts of law issues
that arose in the Settlement. Unfortunately, due to the geographic diversity of the
Manville parties and the wide variances among the states' laws, the court would have
been faced with so many subclasses that the use of a class action mechanism would have
been practically impossible.
11. The court estimated that as many as 170,000 additional claims may be brought
against the Trust in the future. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129
B.R. at 771.
118 If the "future claimants" had not been included in the Manville class action,
they would have been free to bring lawsuits directly against the Trust in the future.
Thus, they would not have been bound by the payment procedures contained in the
Settlement undermining its effectiveness.
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is a party to the case and has the same interests.11 In Manville,
there was no party who could adequately represent the interests
of future claimants. The parties who were physically present in
the class action sought to maximize their own recoveries. To the
extent that they were successful, less compensation would be
available for future claimants because the Trust constituted a
limited fund. 117 Thus the interests of the present and future
claimants were in direct conflict on the basic issue of distribu-
tion of the Trust's funds.118 Accordingly, no present claimant
could serve as an adequate representative of future benefi-
ciaries.119 Judge Weinstein solved this problem by authorizing
the appointment of separate counsel to represent the interests of
the future claimants.120
c. Rule 23 Requirements
For the Manville court to certify the class action, the claim-
ants had to demonstrate that the class would meet the four pre-
requisites of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality
and adequate representation. 21 While some courts have held
that mass torts, such as asbestos, do not meet these prerequi-
sites',122 Judge Weinstein ruled that the prospective Manville
class met them all.'
2 3
The numerosity prerequisite requires that "the class [be] so
216 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, reh'g denied 492 U.S. 932 (1989).
11 Future claimants would want to limit the recoveries of those parties that were
present and thus increase the amount of funds available to compensate them at a later
date. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 772.
I's Id.
119 Id.
120 The court based its authority to appoint such a representative counsel on bank-
ruptcy law, trust law and the court's own equitable powers. Id. The court also cited the
appointment of a similar representative for future claimants during the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. The Second Circuit had expressly affirmed the appointment upon appeal. Kane
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 644 (2d Cir. 1988).
2" See infra notes 124-41 and accompanying text. See also Deitsch-Perez, supra
note 98, at 524.
'2 See Deitsch-Perez, supra note 98, at 524-25. One of the more convincing argu-
ments used by commentators and courts for finding that mass torts do not meet the
prerequisites of Rule 23 is the nature of the claims themselves. Id. Tort claims are ex-
tremely fact specific as are defense strategies. Moreover, wide factual variations among
class members' cases make it more difficult to treat them as a single class under Rule 23.
Id.
12 See infra notes 124-41 and accompanying text.
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numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.""12 Judge
Weinstein found that the proposed Manville class easily met
this standard since the joinder of tens of thousands of litigants
in any form other than that of a representative class action
would clearly be impractical. 12 5
A class must also have "questions of law or fact common to
the class" to meet the prerequisite of commonality. 126 The court
disposed of this requirement by adopting a liberal approach to
the commonality standard that requires only a minimum of one
common issue among the class members. 27 The court then
found a number of questions of law and fact that were common
to the entire class.' 2s Accordingly, the court held that the pro-
posed Manville class met the commonality prerequisite.
,24 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
1M5 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 817 (E. &
S.D.N.Y 1991). In fact the court considered a class action as the only possible way to
handle this number of claims in a single proceeding. Id. The court cited several addi-
tional reasons aside from the size of the litigation for its ruling. First, the court noted
that the prospective class included a category of persons "as yet unknown." Id. This
statement referred to those victims who do not have symptoms of any asbestos-related
disease, and consequently have not therefore brought claims against the Trust. The join-
der of these future plaintiffs would be impossible in any manner other than a class ac-
tion. The court also noted that joinder in any form other than that of a class action
would place a severe burden on the national court system since class members were
widely dispersed geographically. Id.
120 FED. P, Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
"I The court cited Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269, 271, (E.D. Tex.
1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) and Port Authority Police Benevolent Ass'n v.
Port Authority, 698 F.2d 150, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1983) as support for this approach. In Port
Authority, the Second Circuit held that the commonality standard does not require that
all members of the class bring identical claims, but only that some issues are common to
the class as a whole.
The court also noted that the proposed Settlement would render many of the ques-
tions of fact or law that were uncommon to the class superfluous if it were approved. In
re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 819. Determinations re-
garding individual causation and proportional liability among the codefendants would be
resolved outside of the court system. Id.
128 The court found that all class members shared the common question of whether
the Trust's procedures should be changed to reflect its present condition. Id. at 818. The
court also noted that the claims brought by the class shared a "common nucleus of oper-
ative facts" because the theories of liability and the factual evidence necessary to prove
Manville's culpability were common to all the class members. Id. In addition, the court
found that Manville would raise the same defense in all of the proceedings by claiming
that it was unaware of the risks of asbestos at the time it produced such large quantities
of the substance. Therefore, each plaintiff or defendant would have to overcome the
same defense. Id. at 819. Finally, the court found that all the class members shared a
significant interest in reaching an equitable and final resolution of the case. Id.
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The court next turned to the question of whether the pro-
posed class met the typicality prerequisite. Typicality requires
that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be]
typical of the claims or defenses of the class." 2 The codefend-
ants objected that the proposed class did not meet this standard.
Their argument focused on the fact that all the class representa-
tives were plaintiffs with personal injury claims; since the. code-
fendants' claims were for indemnification or contribution rather
than personal injury compensation, they argued that the claims
of the named representatives were not typical to that portion of
the class made up of codefendants. 30 Judge Weinstein, however,
rejected this argument. The court took the view that all the class
members' claims were substantially similar since each class
member sought compensation from the Trust for injuries caused
by Manville's asbestos products "either directly as an injured
person or indirectly as a third-party claimant with contribution
or indemnification rights."'' Furthermore, the court noted that
all beneficiaries of the AH Trust were treated similarly under
the Settlement's payment procedures. 132 By adopting this gener-
alized view of the codefendants' claims, the court was able to
hold that the typicality standard was met by the named
representatives."33
The final prerequisite for certification of a proposed class is
that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class."'' 4 The court interpreted adequate
representation as imposing a dual standard on the named repre-
sentatives. First, the claims by the class representatives could
not be in conflict with the remainder of the class. 33 Second, the
129 FED. 1R Cirv. P. 23(a)(3).
130 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 820. The code-
fendants also argued that because the plaintiffs and codefendants were on opposite sides
of other asbestos cases, the claims of one group could not be typical of the other group in
Manville. Id.
131 Id.
1-2 Id. Any claim for contribution or indemnification by a codefendant would be
treated under the Settlement's new payment procedures as if the claim were teing made
by an injured plaintiff. Therefore, the court held that all the beneficiarles stood in the
same position vis-a-vis the Trust regardless of whether they were plaintiffs or
codefendants.
13 Id.
' FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
13 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 820 (E. &
S.D.N.Y 1991).
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court had to be satisfied that the class counsel was qualified and
able to handle the class litigation.130 While there was little dis-
pute over the qualifications of the class counsel, codefendants
argued that the class was actually composed of two separate
groups, one composed of the codefendants and one made up of
plaintiffs. Moreover, the codefendants claimed that the interests
of these two groups were antagonistic to one another.137 Thus,
the codefendants alleged that they were not adequately repre-
sented because none of the class representatives were
codefendants. 13
Judge Weinstein again took a broad view of the claims
against the Trust in rejecting the codefendants' argument. He
stressed the common interests of all of the beneficiaries in re-
structuring the Trust and insuring that funds remained for all
beneficiaries. 19 In addition, he pointed to the uniform treatment
of all claimants under the Trust's payment procedure as further
evidence that the interests of the representatives and codefend-
ants were not antagonistic to one another." 0 Finally, Judge
Weinstein noted the extensive participation of the codefendants
and court appointees in the reorganization and class action pro-
ceedings. According to the court this active involvement meant
that all members of the class received adequate
'4'representation. m
After a prospective class meets all the prerequisites under
Rule 23(a), the party seeking class certification must still show
that the proceedings fall under one of the four situations in sec-
tion (b) to justify the use of a class action. In Manville the
plaintiffs moved for class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B),
commonly referred to as the limited fund class." 2 A limited fund
136 Id. at 821.
237 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
1o Id. The court admitted that the interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants
were "not aligned in all respects", however, the court held that both groups shared
enough common ground in relation to the Trust to satisfy Rule 23 (a)(4). Id.
Id. at 821-22.
12 Federal Rule 23(b)(1)(B) permits a class action if the prerequisites of subsection
(a) are met, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
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exists where multiple claims are brought against a fund that is
insufficient to satisfy all claims.143 While the parties disagreed as
to the current value of the Trust, no party disputed that it satis-
fied the limited fund standard.1" Judge Weinstein, relying on
the extensive evidence gathered through the courts' hearings
and inquiries on the limited fund question, found that the Trust
satisfied the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) standard beyond any possible
doubt.145 Accordingly, the court certified a mandatory class
under that section of Rule 23.
d. The Right to Opt Out?
A number of parties responded to the court's certification of
a class action by filing motions to opt out of the Manville class.
While limited fund class actions have traditionally been viewed
as not affording parties a right to opt out of the case, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts24'
has caused some commentators to question the continued viabil-
ity of mandatory class actions. In deciding that parties could not
opt out of the Manville class, the court relied heavily on law
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or im-
pede their ability to protect their interests.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
243 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B), advisory committee notes (1966).
14, In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 765.
145 Id. at 829. The court had appointed a special master to investigate and hold
hearings on the limited fund issue. Id. at 764. His report indicated that the Trust had
assets worth between $2.1 and $2.7 billion, while facing liabilities of approximately $7
billion. Id. at 829.
146 472 U.S. 797 (1985). The language that has led to a renewed debate over the
continued viability of mandatory class actions provides:
If the forum state wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for
monetary relief or similar relief at law, it must provide minimal procedural due
process protection. The plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be
heard and participate in the litigation, either in person or through counsel ....
Additionally, we hold that due process requires at a minimum that an absent
plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by
executing and returning an "opt out" or "request for exclusion" form to the
court.
Id. at 811-12. Some commentators have construed this language as precluding mandatory
class actions. See, e.g., Bob Wenbourne, Note, Phillips Petroleum Company V. Shutts:
Procedural Due Process and Absent Class Members: Minimum Contacts Is Out - Is
Individual Notice In?, 13 HAsrnNGs CoNSr. L.Q. 817, 821 (1986); Rebecca K. Michalek,
Note, Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts: Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: A Def-
inite Forum, But Is It Proper?, 19 J. MAsHALL L Rxv. 483, 485 (1986).
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review articles and recent cases that have concluded that
mandatory class actions survive the Court's Shutts decision.147
The court also construed the primary relief in Manville as being
equitable rather than legal in nature and thus held that Shutts
did not apply to the case.1 48 Accordingly, the court denied the
parties' motions to opt out of the Manville class.
2. Settlement and Conflicts of Law
On the same day that the plaintiffs' representative counsel
filed a class action complaint against the AH Trust, they also
submitted a proposed Settlement of the case.140 However, many
of the members of the Manville class-especially the codefend-
ants and third party defendants-actively opposed the Settle-
ment.150 Under Rule 23(e) no class action can be dismissed or
147 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 830-33 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991). The Manville court cited a number of law review articles which con-
cluded that mandatory class actions are still permissible. See Arthur R. Miller & David
Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1 (1986); Mark C. Weber, Preclusions and Proce-
dural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 347, 349 (1988).
The Court also cited several circuit court decisions upholding the use of mandatory, no-
opt out classes. See In re A.H. Robbins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 744-46 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied sub nom., Anderson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989); County of
Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1303 (2d Cir. 1990).
14' In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 832 ("By its
language and holding, Shutts only addressed the right to due process and opt out in
class actions primarily for money damages. The primary relief sought in the present class
action is equitable.").
149 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 767. It is impor-
tant to note that the representative counsel and the court viewed the class action itself
primarily as a step toward settlement of the entire litigation. Because of this approach, it
is questionable whether Manville would have gone forward as a class action in the ab-
sence of the Settlement.
10 The court found that a majority of the plaintiff members of the Manville class
approved of the Settlement. In reaching this determination, however, the court included
future claimants in its calculations. Id. at 783. Naturally, future claimants would favor
any Settlement that set aside compensation for them since the original Reorganization
Plan had contained no such provisions. Of the plaintiffs with current claims against the
Trust, the approval rating of the Settlement was closer to 50% and may even have been
lower. Id. at 776-83. The codefendants were the strongest advocates against approving
the Settlement and were the only group unanimous in its opposition. Id. at 784. The
primary reason that the codefendants contested the Settlement so heatedly was the ef-
fects of section H, which operated to shift much of Manville's asbestos liability to them.
See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text. The third party defendants, in large part,
shared the codefendants' objections to the Settlement. Id. at 785-89. Finally, the Trust
and Manville Corporation both favored the Settlement. Id. at 790-91.
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compromised without the court's approval. 1 Generally approval
is only appropriate if the settlement is reasonable in light of the
risks and costs of continuing the litigation.1 12 To determine if
the proposed Settlement met this standard in Manville, the
court had to address the objections raised by class members and
resolve them in a satisfactory manner.
Like the decision to seek class action certification, the pro-
posed Settlement resulted in numerous and wide-ranging objec-
tions from many class members.5 3 However, the most vigorous
objections and the ones that the court had the greatest difficulty
resolving were raised in connection with section H of the
Settlement."'
a. Section H
While the Settlement itself was complex, its primary objec-
tive was deceptively simple. The ultimate goal of the Settlement
was to remove the Trust from the tort system." 5 To facilitate
that objective, the settlement included provisions in section H'11
'" Federal Rule 23(e) provides that- "A class action shall not be dimised or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or com-
promise shall be given to all members of the class in such a manner as the court directs."
FED R Civ. P. 23(e).
Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972).
1 Some of the issues raised by the proposed Settlement included whether the par-
ties could approve an amendment to an existing Trust under New York law without the
unanimous consent of all the beneficiaries, whether the Settlement was workable, and
whether the Settlement complied with bankruptcy law. In re Joint Eastern & Southern
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 840, 843 & 855.
1' See -In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 869-904.
155 "At the heart of the Settlement is its effort to extricate the Trust from litigation.
This must be accomplished in an equitable fashion that does not place unnecessary
transaction costs on the Trust." Id. at 877. The Settlement did not remove the Trust
entirely from the tort system since claimants still retained the right to sue the Trust.
However, judgments in excess of the values set by the Settlement would only be paid
after all other claims had been paid. By reducing the Trust's participation in the tort
system, the court hoped to avoid most of the transaction costs that accompany asbestos
litigation. This, in turn, would enable the Trust to devote more of its limited funds to
compensating the beneficiaries.
1" Section H of the stipulation of the Settlement provides, in pertinent part-
In order to conserve the assets of the Trust, Trust beneficiaries - both plain-
tiffs and defendants - will be ordered to dismiss, without prejudice, all present
cases, will be enjoined from filing future litigation against Manvile or the
Trust, and will be required to pursue their claims against the Trust only as
provided in the Distribution Process. The injunction Vill extend to all issues
involving the Trust including its status as a joint tortfeasor, its relative share
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that governed the parties' activities in any other pending or fu-
ture litigations between class members. 57 First, all class mem-
bers were barred from impleading the Trust into any other as-
bestos litigation.15 Second, no party could introduce any
evidence regarding Manville's share of fault in causing a plain-
tiffs injury in any other case. 59 Finally, the Settlement con-
tained uniform rules on the issues of joint and several liability
and claims for contribution that were to be applied in other as-
bestos cases.160 The latter two provisions resulted in strenuous
of fault, if any, or its liability or lack of liability for contribution. Except for
appeals now pending, the Trust will make no appearances in any court, and no
beneficiary will be permitted to proceed in any manner against the Trust or
Manville in any State or federal court, except as provided in C above. In any
litigation between beneficiaries of the Trust, all beneficiaries will be enjoined
from asserting, or introducing, evidence to establish (a) that the Trust (in
Manville's stead) is a joint and or several tortfeasor, (b) that the Trust is in
any way responsible for any injury, or (c) that the Trust would have been re-
sponsible for any injury had it been made or remained a party in the case. All
beneficiaries must pursue their claims-whether for asbestos disease, or for
contribution or indemnification-within the Trust Distribution Process ....
In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 676 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1990).
M In analyzing section H of the Settlement, it must be remembered that many of
the plaintiffs and codefendants of the Manville class were opponents in other asbestos
proceedings throughout the nation. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. Fur-
thermore, Manville was a prospective party to many of these actions. Plaintiffs or code-
fendants could, under the original Reorganization Plan, implead the Trust (in Manville's
stead) into those cases. Thus, section H was part of the parties' efforts to reduce
Manville's participation in these asbestos cases and thereby reduce the Trust's opera-
tional and legal costs.
156 The impleader ban was the primary mechanism adopted in the Settlement to
keep the Trust out of the tort system and resulted, in large part, from the parties' expe-
rience with the original Reorganization Plan. The 1988 Plan allowed the Trust to be
impleaded into ongoing asbestos litigation and was one of the primary factors contribut-
ing to the Trust's insolvency. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Lit., 129
B.R. 710, 758 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
"' The evidence bar was intended to avoid the problems of "litigating with the
empty chair." Id. at 903. In many cases involving multiple defendants, if one or more of
the defendants are not present in the courtroom to protect their interests, these absent
parties tend to have a disproportionate amount of any award assessed against them. Id.
at 904. Since Manville was specifically prohibited from appearing in court by the Settle-
ment, provisions had to be included to reduce the chances that Manville would suffer
disproportionate judgments against it.
'60 The Settlement specifically adopted the doctrine of joint and several liability; it
allowed joint tortfeasors to be held fully liable for any judgment against other joint
tortfeasors. Id. at 869. The operative effect of this provision was to shift much of
Manville's liability onto the shoulders of the codefendants and third-party defendants
since Manville could only pay a portion of any judgment against it. Under joint and
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objections from some of the members of the Manville class.201
The difficulty with section H, however, was that the sub-
stantive laws of the states varied widely on the issues governed
by its provisions and, in some cases, the provisions directly con-
flicted with a particular state's law.1 2 Moreover, section H also
abrogated some of the class members' rights that arose indepen-
dently under state law. 63 Since the Manville class included liti-
several liability the non-Manville defendants would be liable for any shortfall. The Set-
tlement also affected the codefendants' and third-party defendants' contribution claims
by adopting a uniform method of calculating set-offs. See infra note 163 and accompany-
ing text.
"I The objections to the evidence bar were raised by some plaintiff class members,
the codefendants and the third party defendants because all three groups used Manville
evidence. Id. at 902-03. Plaintiffs rely on such evidence to prove industry knowledge of
the hazards of asbestos, while defendants typically use Manville-related evidence to show
that Manville products, rather than their own products, caused the plaintiffs' injuries.
Id. The objections to the uniform rules on joint liability and contribution claims came
primarily from the codefendants and third party defendants. They claimed that it
shifted much of Manville's asbestos liability to them. See infra notes 162-63 and accom-
panying text.
18' The Settlement's adoption of joint and several liability was in direct conflict with
the majority of states that have either abolished this doctrine entirely or severely re-
stricted its use. 129 B.R. at 892-93. In addition, the evidence bar was contrary to the
substantive laws of several states in which asbestos litigation among the class members
was pending. Id. at 904.
I The clearest example of the Settlement affecting parties' independent rights was
in connection with contribution claims by the codefendants and third party defendants.
The laws of the states vary widely in regard to contribution claims in the settlement
context. In 43 states, the non-settling tortfeasor is entitled to some form of set-off to
reflect the plaintiff's settlement with a joint tortfeasor. Id. at 893. There are three types
of set-offs applied by the different states: the pro tanto method, the pro rata method,
and the equitable share method.
The pro tanto rule, which is employed by the majority of jur'Ldictions, subtracts the
actual amount received by the plaintiff through settlement from any subsequent recov-
ery from the non-settling joint tortfeasor. See, e.g., CAL. CoDE Civ. Paoc. § 877 (1937).
While this rule may result in the non-settling tortfeasor being responsible for more than
its appropriate share, it serves to encourage settlement among the parties through that
very threat.
The pro rata rule subtracts an equally apportioned amount from any judgment re-
ceived against non-settling tortfeasors. Under this rule, if the plaintiff settles with one of
four joint tortfeasors, the non-settling defendants are entitled to a 25% reduction in any
judgment against them. This rule serves to discourage settlement since the plaintiff runs
the risk of not obtaining a complete recovery if the plaintiff settles with any defendant
for less than the pro rata share. Id. at 894.
The final type of set-off rules applied by one-fifth of the jurisdictions is the equita-
ble share method. This rule subtracts the settling defendants' share of liability from any
judgments against non-settling tortfeasors. See, e.g., IOWA CoDE § 668.7 (1984). The
Manville court also found that this rule discouraged settlement since a settling plaintiff
would not receive full compensation if the plaintiff settled for les than a defendant's
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gants from all fifty states, the court had to determine if the pro-
visions of section H were permissible in light of the conflicting
laws of the states.
b. Federal Common Law
The court first considered whether it could apply uniform,
federal common law to the case and thus dispose entirely of the
conflicts of law issues."8 4 In considering the possibility of apply-
ing federal law, the court was constrained by the Erie doctrine,
which requires a federal court sitting in diversity to apply the
substantive laws of the states.165 This rule has been specifically
extended by the Supreme Court to nationwide class actions.10
However, there are a number of limited exceptions where a court
is justified in applying federal common law to a case. In the ab-
sence of statutory authority, federal common law has been ap-
plied to cases involving the rights and duties of the United
States,17 conflicts among the states,"" international affairs' 69
and "unique federal interests.'1 0 Since the only possible predi-
equitable share. Id.
Since codefendants and third party defendants were involved in asbestos litigations
in all fifty states, they had different set-off rights depending upon the rule adopted by
the forum in which the case was brought. The Manville court, however, interpreted sec-
tion H of the Settlement as adopting the pro tanto method of calculating set-offs. Id. at
893. What this interpretation meant was that codefendants and third party defendants
in those jurisdictions that utilized the pro rata and equitable share set-offs would lose
those rights under the Settlement and would be forced to use the less favorable pro
tanto rule. Naturally, the affected parties objected heatedly to the court's decision on
this issue. Id. at 785.
1" If the court had found that federal common law could be applied to the case, the
conflicts between section H's provisions and the laws of the various states would have
become irrelevant. When a case involves federal common law, the court and the parties
are free to ignore the substantive laws of the state and fashion a form of relief based
exclusively on federal law. See Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause For More
Darkness On The Subject, Or A New Role For Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L.
REv. 167, 190 (1985).
165 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
166 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 365 (1943).
160 Hinderlider State Eng'r v. La Plata and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938).
169 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
"0 The Fifth Circuit provided a clear definition of what constituted unique federal
interests in Jackson v. Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d 1314, 1325 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
("[T]o be 'uniquely federal' and thus a sufficient predicate for the imposition of a federal
substantive rule, an interest must relate to an articulated congressional policy or directly
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cate for the imposition of federal common law in Manville was
the federal interests exception, the court first analyzed the case
to determine if sufficiently unique federal interests existed.
While the court found several unique federal interests pre-
sent in the Manville litigation,171 it eventually concluded that
the application of federal common law would be inappropri-
ate.172 In reaching that decision, Judge Weinstein was heavily in-
fluenced by the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Jackson v. Johns-
Manville.173 In that case, the district court had attempted to ap-
ply federal common law to punitive damage claims in an asbes-
tos class action.17 4 The Fifth Circuit reversed and held that in
the absence of congressional action in connection with asbestos,
federal courts remained constrained by the substantive laws of
states." 5
Judge Weinstein also noted that the strong federalism con-
cerns implicated by the asbestos debate militated against apply-
ing federal common law to Manville.7 6 While most states have
recently revised their tort laws, Congress has repeatedly failed to
implicate the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign.").
"I The court identified two separate interests in Manville that could justify the
imposition of federal common law. First, the court found that there was a unique federal
interest in preserving the bankruptcy plan of a major corporation. In re Joint Eastern &
Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 875 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). In addition, the
court held that the preservation of a settlement in a difficult cks action affecting
160,000 claimants was also a uniquely federal interest. Id. at 877. However, despite these
two interests, the court eventually concluded that applying federal common law in the
instant case would be inappropriate. Id. at 877-78.
172 Id.
171 Jackson v. Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985).
17" The district court had premised its application of federal common law on three
perceived unique federal interests in the case. First, the court analogized the conflict
among states over the limited pool of asbestos capital to disputes that arise between
states over water rights and natural resources. Id. at 1324. See also Hinderlider State
Eng'r v. La Plata and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). The Fifth Circuit,
however, rejected this analogy. The Fifth Circuit also rejected the district court's finding
that the preservation of major government suppliers represented a unique federal inter-
est. Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1324-25. Finally, the circuit court rejected the lower court's
holding that there was a unique federal interest in ensuring the equitable resolution of
asbestos mass tort cases as too all-encompassing. Id. at 1326.
176 Id. at 1327. In reaching its decision not to apply federal common law, the Fifth
Circuit seemed to feel that any court-imposed solution would essentially be legislative in
nature and thus inappropriate. Id. ("There is no doubt that a desperate need exists for
federal legislation in the field of asbestos litigation. Congress' silence on the matter, how-
ever, hardly authorizes the federal judiciary to assume for itself the responsibility for
formulating what are essentially legislative solutions.").
176 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 878.
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enact any national legislation addressing the issue.'1 7 Since
states have recently acted in the tort area and Congress has not,
the court felt compelled to give priority to state law in Manville.
Accordingly, Judge Weinstein concluded that federal common
law could not be applied in Manville.7 s
c. Conflicts of Law
Having concluded that federal common law could not be ap-
plied to the case, the court had to determine if section H was
permissible in light of applicable state law. Since the provisions
in section H conflicted with the substantive laws of some states,
the court was forced to undertake a conflicts of law analysis to
determine which state's law applied.17 9 Under Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.' 80 a federal court sitting in
diversity is required to use the conflicts of law rules of the state
in which it is located. Thus, under Klaxon the Manville court
had to use the New York conflicts of law rules.18 '
177 Id.
178 Id. ("We are loath to cut the Gordian knot presented by state tort law diversity
using the sword of federal common law without congressional warrant.").
179 Black's Law Dictionary defines conflict of laws as:
Inconsistency or difference between the laws of different states or countries,
arising in the case of persons who have acquired rights, incurred obligations,
injuries or damages, or made contracts, within the territory of two or more
jurisdictions. Hence, that branch of jurisprudence, arising from the diversity of
the laws of the different nations, states or jurisdictions, in their application to
rights and remedies, which reconciles the inconsistency, or decides which law
or system is to govern in the particular case, or settles the degree of force to be
accorded to the law of another jurisdiction, (the acts or rights in question hav-
ing arisen under it) either where it varies from the domestic law, or where the
domestic law is silent or not exclusively applicable to the case at point.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299-300 (6th ed. 1990).
18o 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
181 The court was also constrained in its choice of which state's substantive laws
would apply under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Due process limits a
federal court's choice of substantive law in diversity cases to the laws of a state that has
significant interests in the litigations. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13
(1981) ("For a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible
manner, that state must have a significant contact or aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that the choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair."); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (extending the holding of
Allstate to federal class actions).
The court determined that it would be able to apply New York substantive law since
New York had numerous contacts with the Manville litigation. The Trust was initially
created in New York, its assets were located there and it was based in that state. In re
Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 883. Many of the plaintiffs
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Application of New York conflicts of law rules, however,
proved to be fruitless.8 2 A conflicts of law analysis by a federal
court is essentially a two step process. First, the judge must de-
termine what action the courts in the state in which the federal
court sits would take in the same situation. Second, it must
make this determination in light of the various state laws impli-
cated in the litigation.83 The primary difficulty in the instant
case lay with the second step. Since Manville encompassed a
large number of litigants from all fifty states, the second step
would effectively require the court to examine the tort laws of
every state.1 84 In addition, many of these states have recently
adopted tort reform statutes and have yet to define adequately
their precise scope or effect. ' The combination of these two
factors led the court to conclude that New York conflicts of law
rules did not clearly lead to the imposition of a single forum's
law in Manville."as
were residents of New York and key codefendants were either incorporated in that state
or had their principal place of business there. Id. Finally, the court found that many of
the sites where plaintiffs had been injured were also located in New York. Id. Accord-
ingly, the court determined that the choice of New York's substantive law was constitu-
tionally permissible. Id.
Despite this determination, the court was eventually precluded from applying New
York substantive law because the New York choice of law rules did not permit the court
to do so. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
1'm The court first attempted to apply New York contractual choice of law rules on
the premise that the Settlement represented a contract among the parties. Id. at 895.
This theory, however, could not be sustained in connection with the codefendants since
they had never consented to the Settlement and had, in fact, unanimously opposed it. Id.
at 886. The court then turned to New York tort choice of law rules. Id. This too eventu-
ally proved useless because of the uncertainty of the states' various tort laws. Id. at 8S9.
18I Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit succinctly summed up the difficulties that a
federal court often faces in any choice of law analysis. The task as he defined it was "to
determine what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on
an issue about which neither had thought." Nolan v. Transocean Air Line, 276 F.2d 280,
281 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated and remanded, 365 U.S. 293, on remand, 290 F.2d 904 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 901 (1961).
18" In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 884 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991).
185 Id.
18 Id. at 889 ("Given the confused national tort law scene, it requires abandonment
of every shred of skepticism to believe that New York would project a single rule of tort
law on all the states. We cannot say with confidence that New York's rule of conflicts can
be interpreted as leading to the results reached in section H of the Settlement.").
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d. Resolution of Conflicts Issues
The court's failure to reach a decision on what law applied
to the instant case had serious ramifications on the Settlement.
The conflicts created by the provisions in section H could not be
adequately resolved by the court and no conclusion could be
reached regarding their permissibility without determining
which state law applied. 18 7 Accordingly, the court held that
those provisions in section H that conflicted with laws of some
of the states were not binding in other pending or future asbes-
tos actions. 18  The ultimate determination regarding the permis-
sibility of these uniform rules would be made by courts handling
a case in which the issue arose.189 The court did, however, stress
that no court could force the Trust to take part in any litiga-
tion.9 0 To enforce this prohibition, the court upheld the im-
187 Mindful of Erie and comity considerations, the courts cannot disregard the
contents of the recently enacted tort reform statutes in many states .... Vari-
ations in laws respecting joint and several liability, contribution and indemnifi-
cation rights, and set offs must be considered. This exercise convinces the
courts that the ultimate resolution of the applicable law in pending state and
federal asbestos cases must be determined by the court hearing the case at the
time the issue is presented.
Id.
188 Id. The court did, however, encourage other courts to follow the rules adopted in
Section H as much as possible. Id. at 878.
This is not to say that other state and federal courts ought not follow the rules
adopted in the Settlement in the interest of consistent and equitable treatment
of all beneficiaries to the extent that it does not violate a state's public policy.
Emphatically, they should do so. But, when the state's public policy and the
dictates of Erie prevent this sensible result, they cannot be compelled by the
federal courts to do so.
Id.
As part of its effort to encourage other courts to adhere to the provisions of section
H, the court attempted to provide some guidance on applying the rules contained in that
section. The court provided estimates of the appropriate set-offs to apply in other asbes-
tos litigations, concluding that Manville's share of liability was 15% of the value of a
claim involving a serious disease and 7.5% for less serious types of diseases. Id. at 894.
These estimates, however, were only intended to be temporary and would be reexamined
once the court had more definite information in connection with Manville's correct share
of fault. Id. at 895.
Il Id. at 894. Thus under the court's holding the codefendants and third party de-
fendants could contest the application of the section H provisions in other asbestos
cases. Whether they would be held to the rules in section H in those cases would be
decided by the court hearing the case at the time.
190 Id. ("The courts interpret the Settlement as permitting the parties to exercise
their evidence and substantive law policies to regulate the relationship between plaintiffs
and codefendants so long as the method of recovery from the Trust is not affected and
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pleader bar contained in section H that precluded the implead-
ing of the Trust into any other asbestos case.1 "
Despite the problems and uncertainties created by the pro-
visions in section H, the court eventually concluded that the
Settlement met the fairness requirements of Rule 23(e).'02 In
reaching that result, the court reviewed the entire Settlement in
light of available alternatives and concluded that no "appealing"
alternative existed.""3 The court also considered whether section
H prejudiced the rights of certain parties to such an extent that
the entire Settlement had to be rejected.1 04 It concluded that the
Settlement did not. 9 5 Finally, the court identified a number of
public policy reasons for approving the Settlement despite the
ambiguities in section H. 96 The court eventually went on to ap-
the Trust is not required to participate in any way in any litigation.").
191 Id. at 904.
192 Id. at 895 ("[The courts find that as construed section H meets Rule 23(e)'s
fairness standard. Much of the section's language is precatory; its precise contours will
be defined by the courts and parties in asbestos litigation beyond the scope of this class
action. The courts conclude that its inclusion in the Settlement does not warrant aban-
donment of an otherwise laudable compromise."). In determining that section H met
Rule 23(e)'s fairness standard, the court rejected the class members' objections to the
evidence bar and adoption of the pro tanto method of calculating set-offs. Id.
In connection with the evidence bar, the court concluded that the exclusion of evi-
dence regarding Manville would have little effect on the plaintiffs or defendants in other
asbestos litigation. Id. Plaintiffs could still prove industry knowledge from a variety of
different sources and codefendants could introduce evidence regarding the presence of
other manufacturer's products without identifying the other company. Id. at 902. The
court also found that the Settlement's adoption of the pro tanto set-off rule was reasona-
ble since it was the most common type utilized by the states; thus adoption of the pro
tanto rule would minimize Erie and'comity questions. Id. at 898. In addition, the court
found that the pro tanto rule best served the central goal of the tort system which it
interpreted as full compensation of injured victims. Id. at 897. Finally, the court found
that pro tanto set-offs would reduce the Trust's transaction cost by minimizing litigation
over set-off calculations. Id. at 898.
111 Id. at 895.
2' See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 556 F.2d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1977)
(The fact that a settlement may have some unfavorable results does not warrant rejec-
tion of the entire settlement if, on the whole, it is fair and equitable.).
195 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 897.
I" First, the court found that most asbestos cases settle before trial. See Mullenix,
supra note 53, at 551. The effects of this propensity to settle will be to limit section H's
inclusion of joint and several liability since that doctrine only applies when a case goes to
trial. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 897.
In addition, the court noted that adoption of the pro tanto rule of calculating set-
offs would encourage the parties to settle and thus reduce transaction costs. Id. Finally,
the court noted that many of the tort reforms adopting other methods aside from the pro
tanto rule had only been enacted within the last five years, so that many of the claims
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prove the Settlement in its entirety under Rule 23(e). 19 7
III. ANALYSIS
The history of the Manville litigation, from the company's
1982 bankruptcy filing to Judge Weinstein's latest installment in
the Manville saga in In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist.
Asbestos Litigation, reveals in stark detail the inadequacy of the
tort system as a means of dealing with the asbestos crisis. 19 8 The
traditional tort system, in connection with asbestos litigation,
has been marked by high transaction costs,1 99 excessive delays in
providing compensation to injured plaintiffs,200 unequal recov-
eries among identically injured victims,20' litigious parties0 2 and
a judicial system clogged by an avalanche of cases. 2 3 All of these
problems clearly indicate that something must be done and that
the traditional approach to tort cases has failed in the asbestos
context. The real issue, however, is not whether some type of
reform is needed, but rather what form such corrective action
should take.
Commentators and judges alike agree that the optimal
strategy would be to foster some type of global or comprehensive
solution to the entire crisis. 04 This explains, in part, why calls
for legislative action still persist in the face of continued failures
would still be controlled by pre-reform laws. Id.
'97 Id. at 911.
log The asbestos crisis provides one of the more extreme examples of the mass tort
epidemic that has inundated our judicial system in the last few decades. While other
mass tort litigation does not have the urgency or immediacy that is apparent in the
asbestos context, the points in this Comment regarding the beneficial use of class actions
apply with varying weight to other types of mass tort litigation.
"I See supra Parts I and 11.
200 In Manville none of the parties received any compensation from the Trust dur-
ing the six-year bankruptcy proceeding. Moreover, payments by the Trust have been
stayed during the class action litigation and will not be resumed until all appeals are
exhausted. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 751.
201 Id. at 749.
202 See supra note 50.
20 See supra note 4.
20, The clearest example of this movement is the frequency of calls for a national
legislative solution. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. Even those commenta-
tors who propose alternative solutions to direct legislative action admit that meaningful
reform can only come about as part of a wider legislative effort to deal with the asbestos
crisis. See, e.g., Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 58, at 539-42 (proposing legislative ex-
pansion of the MDL's power under a new mass tort statute, giving the Panel the author-
ity to consolidate cases for trial and appeal as well as for pretrial proceedings).
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by Congress to address the asbestos issue in any meaningful
fashion. Despite these attempts to spur congressional action,
however, the possibility of a legislative solution remains un-
likely.205 Accordingly, courts and legal commentators must focus
on what can be done within the current tort system to minimize
many of the procedural and substantive problems that arise in
asbestos litigation.
The Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") Panel's consolidation
of all personal injury asbestos cases pending in federal court as
of July 29, 1991 is an important first step in addressing the as-
bestos crisis.20 However, it must be recognized that the MDL
action is only that, a first step.207 While there are some tangible
benefits to the consolidation of all federal cases in a single dis-
trict,20 8 the MDL action falls far short of the comprehensive
global solution needed to resolve adequately the asbestos crisis.
First, the Panel only has the statutory authority to consolidate
cases for pretrial purposes. 09 While it is true that most MDL
cases, in the past, have been disposed of in one way or another
by the transferee court, there is no guarantee that the success of
the MDL procedure will continue in the asbestos context. 2 '0 Sec-
2 o5 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
207 In fact, the MDL Panel itself recognized that consolidation alone would not be
enough to solve the entire asbestos crisis. "[The panel also found that while its decision
had become necessary, it might not make a quick difference for most plaintiffs and de-
fendants. The judges said they were 'under no illusion that centralization will, of itself,
markedly relieve the critical asbestos situation.' They added,'it offers no panacea."' See
Labaton, supra note 62, at Al.
202 The most apparent benefit of the MDL transfer is that the majority of cases,
most of which have been subject to transfer in the past, have been either settled or
dismissed by the transferee court. See Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 58, at 521-22 (not-
ing that only five percent of the cases transferred under the MDL statute are ever re-
manded to the original courts for trial). Another benefit provided by the MDL statute is
the consolidation of all pretrial proceedings; thus under 28 US.C. section 1407 the trans-
feree court is given wide discretion over pretrial matters, such as discovery and motions
for summary judgment. Id. at 522. The pretrial benefits, however, may be somewhat
limited in the asbestos context because the main concern of discovery-proving liabil-
ity-has already been largely established. See Gordon Hunter, Asbestos Supercase Is
Born; Multidistrict Move One of Several, T.x. LAw., Feb. 25, 1991 at 1 (noting that
MDL is usually used to discover common issues of liability that are no longer in question
in the asbestos context).
2'0 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1992).
210 Given the litigious nature of the parties involved in asbestos litigation, it is not
unreasonable to assume that settlement or dismissal through the MDL procedure will be
vigorously resisted.
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ond, even if the past levels of successful disposition are achieved,
some cases will have to be remanded to their original courts for
trial.211 In addition, there is a very real fear among the partici-
pants involved in asbestos litigation that the MDL transfer will
cause even greater delay in providing compensation to injured
plaintiffs.212 The final and potentially greatest problem with the
MDL decision, however, is the limited scope of the order.2 13
Under 28 U.S.C. section 1407 the Panel only has the statutory
authority to consolidate currently pending federal cases; suits
filed in state court remain unaffected by any MDL action.214
This limitation on the Panel's authority is a serious flaw in the
asbestos context because the majority of asbestos cases to date
have been filed in state courts.215 Thus, the effectiveness of the
MDL order is somewhat questionable since it does not even ap-
ply to the majority of asbestos cases. Moreover, there is a real
danger that plaintiffs who have already filed cases in federal
courts will attempt to remove or voluntarily dismiss those cases
21 Based on the MDL's past success rate, five percent of the transferred cases will
have to be remanded to their original courts for trial. See supra note 208. Given the
large number of cases that are affected by the MDL decision, the five percent failure
margin would translate into over 1300 individual cases.
2'2 There is no doubt that in the short run litigants are correct in arguing that the
MDL order will only increase the delay in disposing of asbestos cases. The immediate
effect of the Panel's order was to halt much of the litigation in federal courts as the
parties waited to find out how Judge Weiner would address the problem. "The immedi.
ate effect [of the MDL order] is to halt all personal-injury cases that have not reached
trial in Federal courts. The victims, defendants and lawyers must now await a proposed
solution from Federal District Judge Charles R. Weiner of Philadelphia, to whom the
panel assigned the cases." Labaton, supra note 62, at Al; see also Stephen Labaton,
Asbestos Cases Pose Test For Court Ringmaster, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 16, 1991, at B16
("[Miany plaintiffs' lawyers fear that the panel's order will only further delay things by
setting up another level of bureaucracy. Some defense lawyers have already backed out
of settlement talks in a number of cases around the country on the theory that it would
be cheaper to just wait and see what Judge Weiner has to say about all the cases rather
than continue with a piecemeal approach.").
21 Not only does the MDL order fail to reach any cases filed in state courts, see
infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text, it also exempts all federal cases that have
already reached the trial stage. See Daniel Wise, Asbestos Cases Already Filed Will
Stay Here; Consolidation Order Seen Not Affecting Claims, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 1991, at 1.
21 Commentators who have proposed expanding the statutory power of the MDL
Panel in the mass tort context have also ignored this critical shortcoming. See Chesley &
Kolodgy, supra note 58.
215 As of June 6, 1991 approximately 100,000 asbestos personal injury cases were
pending in state courts nationwide compared with the 31,500 pending federal cases. See
Tracy Schroth, Plan Would Consolidate Federal Asbestos Cases: Panel Seeks To
Streamline Process, N.J. L.J:, June 6, 1991, at 5.
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and then refile them in state courts to avoid inclusion in the
Panel's order.21 In addition, individuals will probably favor fil-
ing future actions in state courts for the same reason, thereby
further increasing the strain on state judicial resources.2 17 Fi-
nally, the jurisdiction of state courts is much more limited than
that of federal courts, so that large consolidations of asbestos
cases for trial and settlement will be far more difficult.218 All of
these shortcomings indicate that the MDL order, while effective
in a limited sense, does not achieve the comprehensive solution
needed in the asbestos context.21
Given the inability of Congress to enact any substantive or
procedural reform that would enable courts to approach the as-
bestos problem from a new angle, the question then becomes
what can be done within the existing system to overcome the
difficulties inherent in asbestos litigation. As Judge Weinstein
recognized in Manville, the most promising procedural device
for avoiding these difficulties currently available to federal
courts is the class action.
Class actions enable a court to consolidate all claims against
an individual asbestos manufacturer into a single case. More-
over, they provide a cost-effective and equitable means of reach-
ing settlements in these complex cases. This does not mean,
however, that all types of class actions are appropriate in the
asbestos context. Admittedly, "common question" class actions
under Rule 23(b)(3) 220 may be precluded by the 1966 advisory
216 "Judges in the state courts, which have even more asbestos cases-two thirds of
the total filed-are also nervous about the multidistrict litigation panel's decision to
transfer the cases to Philadelphia. They are concerned that the plaintiffs, fearing delay,
will now remove their cases and further swamp the state courts, which are already over-
whelmed." See Labaton, supra note 212, at B16.
217 Commentators already worry that those plaintiffs who have filed actions in both
systems will drop their federal cases in favor of proceeding in the state court system. See
Wise, supra note 213, at 1 ("Because plaintiffs have filed actions in both federal and
state courts ... there is 'no question' some plaintiffs will now withdraw their federal
actions and proceed only in state court.").
2 8 See Jerold S. Solovy et al, Class Action Controversies 431 PLI/Lrr 7 (1992)
(comparing the limitations of state class actions as opposed to similar proceedings
brought in federal court).
21' This is not to trivialize the effect of the MDL action. If nothing else, the MDL
Panel's transfer is clear evidence of a growing awareness among the federal judiciary that
actions must be taken to deal with the asbestos crisis immediately. "The ruling provides
official recognition of a growing view among judges and lawyers that many federal courts
are facing a crisis in asbestos litigation." Labaton, suPRA note 62, at Al.
210 Federal Rule 23(b)(3) allows class actions when
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committee's notes and the judicial reluctance to employ them in
the mass tort context.22' These objections, however, do not apply
with equal force to the use of "limited fund" mandatory class
actions in asbestos litigation.
A. Traditional Objections to Class Actions
Much of the judicial reluctance to employ class actions in
the asbestos context can be traced to the advisory committee's
notes that accompanied the 1966 amendments to' Rule 23.22
These comments, however, were made in connection with "com-
mon fund" class actions under subsection (b)(3) of the Rule and
were not meant to apply to limited fund situations, which are
governed by subsection (b) (1).223 The narrow interpretation of
the advisory committee's comments makes sense when one con-
siders that (b)(3) class actions require common questions of fact
or law to predominate. Obviously, the advisory committee be-
lieved that individual questions would always outweigh any com-
mon questions in mass accident cases. This conclusion, however,
in no way affects the use of class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2). Moreover, the advisory committee notes specifically refer
to "mass accident" cases that most commentators recognize as
being different in many respects from mass products liability
(3) the court finds that questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against mem-
bers of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the liti-
gation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
FED R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Commentators and courts typically refer to Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions as "common question" class actions.
221 See Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 58, at 485-86 ("The Advisory Committee to
the amendment, however, opposed the use of class actions in 'mass accidents,' and the
federal courts have followed this mandate in generally refusing to apply Rule 23 to ac-
tions arising from mass exposure torts.").
22 See supra note 13.
22 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee notes ("Subdivision (b)(3) ... A 'mass
accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a
class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but
of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in differ-
ent ways.").
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cases.224 Asbestos litigation falls into the latter category.225 Fi-
nally, the 1966 committee notes explicitly recognize the exis-
tence of "limited fund" class actions under subsection (b)(1) of
the Rule.2 26 Courts have had difficulty in using limited fund
class actions in the mass tort context by focusing incorrectly on
the size of the case. The fact that an asbestos defendant's assets
constitute a limited fund should not be ignored simply because
that defendant is facing a hundred thousand lawsuits instead of
a relatively smaller number. Indeed a mass tort limited fund sit-
uation would seem to provide stronger support for the use of a
class action since the limited fund must be divided among a
larger class of victims and thus there is greater potential that
some victims will be left uncompensated in the absence of such
action.
A number of judges and legal commentators have also ob-
jected to the use of class actions because of the loss of indepen-
dent control that individuals experience over their claims when
they are forced to participate in a large mass tort class.22 This
224 Commentators have typically recognized the difference between these two types
of mass tort litigation. See Rose, supra note 3, at 1183 (stating that there are two types
of mass tort litigation, mass accidents and mass product liability suits); Williams, supra
note 6, at 324 n.1 ("Mass tort litigation can be further divided into two kinds: mass
accident and mass products liability.").
"I See Williams, supra note 6, at 324 n.1 ("A careful examination reveals that, al-
though "a 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for class action ... there is no similar caveat regarding its application to the
product liability context.").
While this argument may be technically correct, it is admittedly weakened by the
nature of mass accidents and mass product liability suits. Mass accidents involve sudden,
disastrous occurrences where all the victims are injured in the same place and at the
same time. Thus, they would seem to share a great deal in common with respect to dam-
ages and liability. Victims of product defects, however, are geographically dispersed and
suffer injuries over a much wider range of time.
22 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee notes (1966).
This clause takes in situations where the judgment in a non class action by or
against an individual member of the class, while not technically concluding
[sic] the other members, might do so as a practical matter .... In various
situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the class will necessa-
rily or probably have an adverse practical effect on the interest of other mem-
bers who should therefore be represented in the lawsuit. This is plainly the
case when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to
satisfy all claims.
Id.
227 See Mass Trials, supra note 54; Mass.Tort Joinder, supra note 54; Judith Res-
nick, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2219 (1989).
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argument, however, largely ignores the reality of mass tort litiga-
tion where individual attorneys often represent hundreds and
sometimes thousands of individual plaintiffs.228 Moreover, mass
tort attorneys frequently negotiate and settle hundreds of cases
at one time.229 In light of the actual practices employed by plain-
tiffs' counsel in asbestos litigation, it is obvious that most plain-
tiffs never have any individual control over their claims even
within the traditional tort system.3 Moreover, even the most
consistent advocates of the traditional individual method of ad-
judication recognize that limited fund situations represent spe-
cial circumstances in which the loss of individual control is justi-
fied.231 When a limited fund exists, the individual's interest in
controlling his or her claim is outweighed by the interest of each
class member in receiving an equitable share of the limited
funds available.232
B. The Benefits of Class Action Treatment
The advantages of using class actions in the mass tort con-
text are too numerous to recite in their entirety. However, a
quick analysis of the potential benefits should suffice to prove
their potential utility to asbestos litigation. The primary advan-
tage of the class action device is that it allows courts to process
228 See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989
U. ILL. L. REv. 89, 92-97 (finding that the majority of mass tort plaintiffs felt that they
had little or no control over the handling of their cases).
2 In Manville 175 law firms represented more than 100 plaintiffs and 32 firms rep-
resented over 1000. See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R.
710, 966-69 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). In addition, group settlements of individual cases were
not uncommon under the Trust's previous FIFO payment procedures. Id. at 756.
20 See Williams, supra note 6, at 330 n.23 ("Almost everyone who has had contact
with plaintiffs of tort litigation at the trial level would admit that, ultimately, everyone
and everything but the injured plaintiff controls the litigation.").
21 Rarely will the available assets and insurance proceeds of all plausible [mass
tort] defendants fall short of the total provable damage claims of the plaintiff
group. In the exceptional case where these conditions actually exist, consolida-
tion of all the plaintiff claims in a single venue for trial may be necessary to
prevent an inequitable distribution of this limited fund of asiets available to
pay the plaintiff group.
Mass Trials, supra note 54, at 77.
222 Mass Tort Joinder,-supra note 54, at 815 ("In those few cases where a limited
fund class action is proper, however, the court should certify a class action. Otherwise,
there is a reasonable likelihood that plaintiffs losing the 'race to the courthouse' will be
unable to obtain fair compensation for their injuries.").
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large numbers of claims in a representative manner.233 Thus a
single case can, in effect, bind thousands of additional class
members who otherwise would have litigated their claims on an
individual basis. This aggregative effect is even more pro-
nounced in mandatory class actions since potential class mem-
bers are not given the alternative of opting out of the class 2
The wholesale adjudication of asbestos cases in this manner en-
ables courts to dispose of these cases more quickly and more effi-
ciently,23 5 thereby reducing the strain on the judicial system
from overloaded dockets.38
In addition, class actions are particularly effective at avoid-
ing much of the duplicative litigation that arises in asbestos and
other types of mass tort cases. 237 By avoiding most of this repeti-
2 By definition, class actions are representative. "One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all ... ." FEn. . Cmv. P. 23.
Class actions maintained under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Rule 23 are typi-
cally referred to as "mandatory" class actions because prospective members are not given
the right to opt out of the litigation. See Edward F. Sherman, Class Action and Duplica-
tive Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 510 (1987) ("The rules .... do not extend a right to be
excluded. Thus, unless the judge exercises discretion to exclude, class members are sad-
dled with having their claims resolved by the class action. Because of the absence of an
opt-out right, (b)(1) and (2) class actions are referred to as 'mandatory.' "). In contrast,
members of a class action brought under subsection (b)(3) must be given the right to opt
out of the class suit so that they can pursue their claims on an individual basis. Id. at
511.
U Id.
16 See Mass Trials, supra note 54, at 76 (noting that the principle justification for
using class actions in mass tort litigation was to conserve scarce judicial resources). The
ability to clear large numbers of cases from court dockets should not be underestimated.
In the mass tort context some commentators have estimated that resolving cases on an
individual basis would take hundreds of years, even if all the cases were consolidated in a
single forum. "Judge Rubin justified ordering a mass trial in the Bendectin litigation by
asserting that trying the hundreds of cases separately would occupy one trial judge for
105 years." Id. at 77.
This concern exposes another weakness in the Multidistrict Panel's consolidation
order. Each case transferred under 28 U.S.C. section 1407(a) must be dealt with on an
individual basis, either in the transferee court or in the court from which the case
originated. The class action mechanism, in contrast, allows a court to use a single case or
a limited number of cases in a representative manner. Once judgments are obtained in
these cases, the figures are then applied to the remaining claims of the class members,
effectively disposing of hundreds or thousands of claims through a single trial.
17 See Sherman, supra note 234, at 510 (identifying the benefits of class actions as
the preservation of party and judicial resources, the prevention of inconsistent verdicts,
and the increased economic viability of comparably small lawsuits); David Rosenberg,
Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IN. LJ.
561, 563-64 (1987) (noting that the case-by-case method of adjudicating mass torts re-
quires each victim to "reinvent the wheel" by proving his or her claim de nova, despite
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tive and wasteful litigation, mandatory class actions significantly
reduce the parties' costs in bringing and defending these claims
and thus provide more available capital to compensate injured
parties.23 Indeed the threat of this type of duplicative litigation
is one of the main justifications of the existence and use of
mandatory class actions.23 9
Another tangible benefit of using mandatory class actions is
that they encourage settlement among the parties.24 0 A class ac-
tion achieves this objective in two ways. First, it applies pressure
on both sides of the litigation to enter meaningful settlement
negotiations.2 ' Second, it allows the parties to negotiate toward
and achieve a comprehensive global settlement of the litiga-
tion.24 2 Class actions contribute to such mass tort settlements by
bringing together large numbers of the parties with an interest
the fact that the major issues of liability have already been determined in other trials).
238 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 710, 802 ( E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Adjudication on a classwide basis enables the court to reduce transac-
tion costs, particularly attorneys' fees, thereby maximizing available resources to com-
pensate injured claimants."). A frequently overlooked advantage of the class action de-
vice is that it enables courts to control and limit attorneys' fees as part of the class
proceedings. See Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881, 884 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984) (holding that part of the court's power to
supervise class action proceedings includes the power to review attorneys' fees). The
need for such judicial scrutiny of attorneys' fees, unfortunately, is quite pronounced in
the asbestos context, which has been marked not only by high and perhaps unreasonable
contingency fee arrangements, but also by allegations of outright attorney fraud. See
Todd Woody, As Stemple Sued, Defendants Retreated: California's Asbestos King
Could Count on Industry to Settle his Massive Suits; Critics Say the Truly Sick Suf-
fered, THE RECORDER, Sept. 12, 1991, at 1 (recounting the large number of questionable
claims brought by a single asbestos attorney in California that led an asbestos manufac-
turer to file a fraud and racketeering suit in 1987).
29 See Sherman, supra note 234, at 510 ("The threat of duplicative litigation is
central to the certification decision in (b)(1) and (2) situations, and that concern is an-
swered by the rules' failure to provide a right to opt-out.").
"10 See Bryant G. Garth, Studying Civil Litigation Through Class Action, 62 IND.
L.J. 497 (1987) (noting that class certification represents a turning point in class actions
after which the parties frequently concentrate on settling the case).
2'4 Defendants are under increased pressure to settle possible class actions because
of the sudden expansion in their potential liability. Before certification, an individual
judgment would only apply to that case. Once certification is approved, however, defend-
ants suddenly face a situation where an adverse verdict could determine their liability in
hundreds or thousands of additional cases as well. Id. at 502 ("Class certification makes
such a difference in the settlement value of the case that defendants will not take plain-
tiffs' claims seriously until certification is achieved."). Plaintiffs are also motivated to
settle once class certification is achieved for fear of losing individual control of their own
cases.
242 See Mass Tort Joinder, supra note 54, at 835-36.
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in the litigation, by enabling those parties to deal with future
claims brought by absent plaintiffs and by providing the defend-
ants with a means of adequately settling possible indemnity and
cross-claims against them.24 All of these factors contribute to
making class actions an effective and efficient way to encourage
global settlements.
The final benefit of mandatory class actions in the asbestos
context is due to the particular nature of asbestos litigation it-
self. Despite the vigorous attempts of plaintiffs' attorneys to ex-
pand the number of companies subject to asbestos liability, 24'
the pool of compensation capital available to asbestos plaintiffs
is steadily shrinking.245 A large number of manufacturers and
producers of asbestos products have already filed voluntary
bankruptcy petitions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.24 Given the steadily expanding number of asbestos claims
being ified in the court system, the diminishing pool of compen-
sation capital and the increasing trend of asbestos-related bank-
ruptcy filings, it is not unreasonable to assume that a large num-
ber of future asbestos cases will take place in the context of
limited fund situations.4 7 The only type of procedural device
that can efficiently and equitably handle these situations are
mandatory class actions under Rule 23(.b)(1). 2 48 Only limited
243 Id.
2,4 See In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 747 (E.
& S.D.N.Y. 1991).
245 Id. ("The sustained success of plaintiffs in establishing liability... helped usher
in a new stage of asbestos litigation in which the burden of jury awards threatens the
viability of many former manufacturers and producers of asbesto3 products.").
2,4 See supra note 47.
24 As Appendix C, attached, suggests, there is strong reason to believe that
unless changes are made in the treatment of asbestos litigation, many if not
most current defendants will be in a limited fund situation. They do not have,
and they probably will not have, assets to pay for their current and contingent
asbestos liabilities given the present mode of disposing of asbestos claims.
In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 907.
2,8 MDL action will not be able to address these limited fund situations on a com-
prehensive basis since the majority of pertinent cases will probably be filed in the state
court system and thus be beyond the reach of the MDL Panel's authority. See supra
note 212 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the transferee court would be able to bind
all federal plaintiffs to a pro rata share in the limited fund, but state court plaintiffs
would still be free to bring individual claims and deplete scarce compensation resources
at the expense of other victims. Common question class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) are
effective, not only because of the traditional reluctance of the judiciary to make use of
them in the mass tort context, but because they fail to provide global settlement, since
plaintiffs are free to opt out of the class action.
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fund class actions provide courts with the mandatory, aggrega-
tive procedures required to ensure that the fund is fairly and
evenly distributed among deserving claimants and is not wasted
through duplicative and unnecessary transaction costs.240
C. Mechanical Problems With Asbestos Mandatory Class
Actions
All the potential benefits of class actions in the asbestos
context, however, matter little if asbestos cases do not fit within
the class action rules. A number of courts and commentators
have made that very claim not only in connection with asbestos
litigation, but also for all mass tort cases.25 While most courts
and commentators agree that asbestos cases and other mass
torts meet the prerequisites of Rule 23(a),25' criticism of mass
1,9 In the absence of a mandatory aggregative procedural device, most parties would
pursue their own individual interests. The result of this advocatory zeal in the limited
fund situation, however, is to encourage a race to the courthouse as plaintiffs attempt to
obtain individual compensation before the common fund is completely exhausted.
The need for protection of the substantive right to damages arises where the
plaintiffs' individual monetary claims are so high that, colectively, they exceed
the assets of the defendants. It is in this 'limited fund' situation that judg-
ments awarded to plaintiffs who have sued earlier than other plaintiffs might
exhaust a defendant's resources, thus effectively depriving subsequent plain-
tiffs of their right to compensation.
Rose, supra note 3, at 1182-83 n.10.
In such [limited fund] cases, if each plaintiff pursued an individual action, the
available funds might be depleted by the first few plaintiffs to win substantial
awards. This result might not be unfair to losers who failed to litigate dili-
gently, but it certainly would be unfair those delayed by uncontrollable factors,
such as crowded court dockets.
Note, Class Certification In Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARv. L. REv.
1143, 1145 (1983) [hereinafter Mass Accident Cases]. In addition, courts have discretion-
ary power in the class action context to limit the transaction costs of asbestos litigation
including attorneys' fees, thereby preserving more of the limited fund for compensatory
purposes. See supra note 238.
20 See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Bendec-
tin Products Liability Litigation, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Northern Dist. of
Cal., Dalkon Shield, Etc., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); Mullenix, supra note 5, at 1049
(describing the imperfect fit between the class action rules and mass tort litigation).
2I See Deitsch-Perez, supra note 98, at 524 ("Because tort litigation often involves
very individualized claims and defenses it is frequently asserted that most of [the Rule
23(a)] prerequisites cannot be met. These assertions are incorrect."); Mullenix, supra
note 5, at 1050 ("[Clourts rarely, if ever, refuse to certify a mass-tort case because the
proposed class fails to meet Rule 23(a) requirements."); Jenkins v. Raymark Indust.,
Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986)(finding that a district-wide common question asbestos
class met the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)).
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tort class actions have focused on the requirements of Rule
23(b).252 Typically certification of mass tort classes is sought
under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(3).253 The reluctance of the judiciary
to certify class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) is understandable
given the 1966 advisory committee notes,2" but the hesitation in
making wider use of limited fund class actions is more difficult
to justify.
1. The Limited Fund Standard
Part of the problem with the use of limited fund class ac-
tions stems from the fact that courts have evolved different tests
to determine if a limited fund exists and have imposed varying
burdens of proof on parties seeking limited fund certification. 5
The Second Circuit has affirmed several cases imposing a "sub-
stantial probability" test.25 Under this standard a party seeking
a limited fund class certification must show that there is a sub-
stantial probability that claims would exceed the assets of the
common fund.257 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has restricted
limited fund certification to those cases where the moving party
can prove "inescapably".that the common fund is inadequate to
satisfy all the claims against it.2 " This test has proven to be
much harsher in operation since it is extremely difficult to meet
such a high standard in connection with the limited fund ques-
tion.259 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that class certifi-
cation is frequently sought at an early point in asbestos cases
before a great deal of discovery has been undertaken by the
2 See Mullenix, supra note 5, at 1051 ("[C]lass certification is most often denied in
mass-tort cases for failure of the proposed class to meet the requirements of Rule
23(b).").
2" See Rose, supra note 3, at 1196.
2- See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
25 Compare In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield Etc., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982) with In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
a)f'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
2 6 See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407 (E.D.N.Y.
1989), af'd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100
F.R.D. 718, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1988).
2 County of Suffolk, 710 F. Supp. at 1418.
2- In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litig. v. A.H.
Robins Company, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
29 Williams, supra note 6.
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parties."'
For several reasons, the proper test to apply in the asbestos
context is the Second Circuit's more relaxed standard. First, by
imposing a lower standard, asbestos litigation would qualify
more quickly for class certification and thus allow courts to dis-
pose of the backlog of cases faster. Second, a lower threshold for
limited fund status would enable asbestos defendants to obtain
comprehensive judgments without filing for bankruptcy protec-
tion.261 Given a choice between a bankruptcy proceeding or a
class action under Rule 23 (b)(1)(B), asbestos defendants would
almost invariably choose to pursue the limited fund status be-
cause of its less disruptive effect on the company's general oper-
ations.2" 2 Keeping asbestos manufacturers out of bankruptcy
proceedings would encourage quicker resolution of asbestos
260 In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 851 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991).
261 Bankruptcy proceedings are another way that asbestos defendants can obtain
global solutions to their potential liability. In bankruptcy proceedings asbestos plaintiffs
are considered creditors by the court and take part in formulating the reorganization
plan of the debtor corporation. See Note, Relief From Tort Liability Through Reorgani-
zation, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1227 (1983) [hereinafter Relief From Tort Liability].
The use of Chapter 11 by asbestos defendants has not been without its critics. See
Lee Ann Flyer, Comment, Will Financially Sound Corporate Debtors Succeed in Using
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act as a Shield Against Massive Tort Liability, 54 TEmp,
L.Q. 539 (1983); Susan S. Ford, Note, Who Will Compensate The Victims of Asbestos-
Related Diseases? Manville's Chapter 11 Fuels the Fire, 14 ENVT. L. 465 (1984).
262 Given the way courts are currently handling mass tort cases, it is clear that
some corporations defending against mass tort claims have decided to file for
bankruptcy in an effort to limit their liability. At first glance, one might con-
clude that those corporations opted for the bankruptcy process in order to cut
out a potential morass of tort claimants. A more detailed inquiry reveals that
most corporations who filed for bankruptcy did so because the court failed to
provide a more efficient means of handling their mass tort claims: namely, the
court failed to certify a class action.
Kevin H. Hudson, Comment, Catch 23(b)(1)(B): The Dilemma of Using the Mandatory
Class Action To Resolve The Problem of the Mass Tort Case, 40 EMORY L.J. 665, 689
(1991). The corporate preference for class action treatment over bankruptcy makes per-
fect sense when one considers the potential drawbacks to a bankruptcy filing.
[A]s a practical matter the decision to file for bankruptcy is not made lightly.
First, in bankruptcy the debtor must conform to restrictions on corporate dis-
bursements and activities, as well as witness the inevitable drop in the value of
its stock. Second, the debtor may be confronted with the loss of day-to-day
control to an appointed bankruptcy trustee. Consequently, as the threat of
mass tort liability becomes more pervasive, corporations will continue to look
to the mandatory class action before resorting to bankruptcy.
Id. at 690.
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claims and reduce transaction costs. 2 3
2. Conflicts of Law
Even if the Second Circuit's substantial probability stan-
dard is adopted nationwide to determine limited fund status,
courts still face yet another significant obstacle in making full
use of mandatory class actions. The lack of any uniform sub-
stantive law applicable to mass litigation compels courts either
to refuse to certify class actions264 or to undertake extensive con-
flicts of law analyses. 6 5 While a number of proposals have been
submitted by legal commentators to solve this problem 266 and
some judges have attempted to deal with the conflicts issue on
2"The immediate effect of a bankruptcy filing is to stay automatically almost all
pending legal actions against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1978). See Relief From Tort
Liability, supra note 259, at 1233. Thus asbestos plaintiffs' cases are stayed, new actions
against the bankrupt defendant are precluded and judgments cannot be recovered. Id. In
Manville the company was in bankruptcy proceedings for over six years. In re Joint
Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 751.
It is important to remember that during the bankruptcy proceedings, transaction
costs such as attorneys' fees continue to accrue, thereby reducing the amount of money
available to compensate injured victims. Hudson, supra note 262, at 690 (noting that
over $100 million in legal and professional fees were paid during the six years of the
Manville bankruptcy proceedings).
2" See Mass Accident Cases, supra note 249, at 1146 n.10 (noting that conflicts of
law problems may make aggregative litigation "infeasible"); Zandman v. Joseph, 102
F.R.D. 924, 929 (N.D. Ind. 1984); In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 64 F.R.D. 443, 455
(S.D. Cal. 1974).
2" Courts are presently compelled to undertake conflicts of law analyes in any
mass tort class action because members of the class tend to be geographically dispersed
throughout a large number of states. Moreover, states' substantive laws differ on such
key issues as what standard of liability should be imposed, when the cause of action
accrues and whether punitive damages are permissible. Vairo, supra note 164, at 171. It
is important to recognize that conflicts of law problems also arise in the settlement of
mass tort class action. See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R.
710, 869 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). This makes a satisfactory solution to the conflicts prob-
lem all the more necessary.
20 The difficulty of dealing with conflicts of law analyses in the mass tort context
has been a fertile ground for legal commentary. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disas-
ters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. I. L. REv. 105 (proposing a new conflicts of law
rule for multistate products liability claims); Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolv-
ing Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. Rsv. 129 (advo-
cating the adoption of either a uniform liability law that would remove conflicts of law
problems from mass torts or a uniform conflicts of law rule); Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass
Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96 YAIJ LJ. 1077
(1987) (favoring a congressionally adopted uniform conflicts of law rule); Vairo, supra
note 164, at 167 (advocating the application of federal common law to avoid conflicts of
law problems in mass tort cases).
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their own,267 to date no court has succeeded in adequately re-
sponding to this problem. The Manville class action is another
example of how conflicts of law issues prevent courts and mass
tort litigants from reaping the full benefits that the use of lim-
ited fund class actions should provide.26 8
The simple and most effective solution to the conflicts prob-
lem is for courts to create a federal common law for asbestos and
other mass tort cases.2"' Federal common law is the easiest an-
swer to the conflicts dilemma because it requires no legislative
action to implement.270 Given the historical reluctance of Con-
gress to act in this field,27' the courts' ability to accomplish this
on their own is a significant advantage. Furthermore, the crea-
tion of a governing federal common law would do away entirely
with the conflicts of law problems because it would enable courts
to fashion new uniform substantive rules on a national basis.
267 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(creating and applying a "national consensus" law in the Agent Orange mass tort case);
see also Aaron D. Twerski, With Liberty and Justice For All: An Essay on Agent Or-
ange and Choice of Law, 52 BROOK. L. Rav. 341 (1986) (examining why Judge Weinstein
was forced to fashion a national consensus law in the Agent Orange action).
268 The conflicts of law problems in Manville arose in an unusual way. Rather than
the court addressing this issue before resolving the dispute between the parties, the court
addressed the conflicts of law issue before the settlement of the trust. In Manville the
parties adopted a settlement that included uniform rules; unfortunately, these rules con-
flicted with many of the states' substantive laws. The court was eventually forced to
undergo a conflicts of law analysis to determine whether the inclusion of these uniform
rules was permissible. See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R.
at 869-904.
26' See Twerski, supra note 267, at 366 ("In short the only way to resolve the con-
flicts problem in [the Agent Orange] case was to create a federal common law."); Vairo,
supra note 164, at 201 ("Federal courts must be allowed to consider whether to develop
and apply federal common law to [mass tort] issues."); Mullenix, supra note 5, at 1077
("To better accomplish mass-tort class action litigation, mass torts should be adjudicated
on the basis of federal common law.").
27 Many of the solutions to mass tort conflicts of law problems proposed in the
past, see supra note 266, can only be accomplished if some form of federal legislation is
enacted. However, given the present political climate, the chances of Congress addressing
the asbestos crisis seems unlikely. Of course there is always the chance that the situation
will become so desperate that Congress will be forced to change its attitude. The prob-
lem with this thinking, however, is twofold. First, Congress may continue to ignore the
problem indefinitely. Second, something must be done now. The legal profession no
longer has the luxury of proposing ideal, hypothetical solutions and waiting to see if they
will be adopted. Unless serious and wide-ranging steps are taken immediately to address
the asbestos problem, the inequities and uncertainties that have plagued the current sys-
tem will only increase as more and more asbestos cases flood the courts.
271 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Thus it would, in effect, remove one of the greatest impediments
to using limited fund class actions in the asbestos context. It
must, however, be conceded that the creation of federal common
law in the mass tort context is not as simple as it sounds. For
courts actually to accomplish this, they must somehow harmo-
nize the use of federal common law in the mass tort context with
the dictates of the Erie doctrine. 2
a. Application of Erie to Asbestos Litigation
The Erie doctrine stands for the proposition that state sub-
stantive laws must be applied in diversity cases in the absence of
some type of controlling federal law.2 73 Since there is no current
federal mass tort law, Erie mandates that federal courts apply
the substantive laws of the state in asbestos class actions. The
difficulty with this directive, however, lies in determining which
state law governs the case. Moreover, since mass torts typically
involve injuries to victims in all fifty states and the laws of the
states vary on key issues in the litigation, the court is forced to
become embroiled in the conflicts of law dilemma. A close analy-
sis of Erie, however, reveals that strict application of state law
to diversity-based asbestos cases actually thwarts the underlying
aims of the Erie doctrine.
The primary reasons identified by Justice Brandeis for his
decision in Erie were to promote uniformity of laws, to prevent
forum shopping by plaintiffs and to achieve fundamental fair-
ness.27 4 The application of this doctrine to mass asbestos cases,
however, results in the very ills that Justice Brandeis sought to
avoid in Erie. First, the strict application of state substantive
law certainly does not lead to uniform application of laws in the
asbestos context.27 5 Under the current approach similarly situ-
272 The key cases that compose the Erie Doctrine are Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See Vairo,
supra note 164, at 172 n.17.
=3 Id.
274 Vairo, supra note 164, at 174 (identifying the underlying policies of Erie as
"avoidance of private party forum shopping, and the achievement of fundamental fair-
ness"); Mullenix, supra note 5, at 1076 n.197 ("The Supreme Court has characterized the
twin aims of the Erie rule as 'discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of une-
qual administration of the laws.' ") (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
1 A clear exanple of this lack of uniformity can be seen in Manville. Since the
court could not successfully choose a single law to govern the case, the applicability of
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ated plaintiffs in different states are subject to different rules
even though their claims result from the same harm.2 7 More-
over, defendants are subject to varying rules regarding potential
defenses and theories of liability for the same action depending
upon which state the lawsuit is brought in.2"
Second, applying state law permits plaintiffs to engage in
wholesale state-to-state forum shopping.278 Under current law
there must be complete diversity between parties in litigation.27 9
The problem is that notions of personal jurisdiction have greatly
expanded in the last fifty years fueled, in part, by the popularity
of state long-arm statutes.28 0 Since mass tort defendants can be
sued in a number of states, plaintiffs will frequently be able to
choose the state most favorable to their cause of action.8 More-
the uniform rules in section H of the Settlement will be decided by the federal and state
courts handling the cases. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R.
710, 889 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). But allowing courts to apply different state laws will
cause different results among similarly situated litigants. Thus state A that utilizes a pro
rata set-off rule and permits the introduction of Manville evidence will be able to cir-
cumvent the uniform rules and evidence bar in section H of the Settlement for litigants
from state A. In contrast state B that uses the pro tanto method of calculating set-offs
and allows the exclusion of Manville evidence will have to adhere to section H's provi-
sions to state B's litigants' own detriment or benefit.
278 This hypothetical, of course, assumes that the states' substantive laws conflict
with one another.
27 The uncertainty surrounding which state's law governs the case increases the
complexity of the litigation and inhibits settlement because the parties cannot accurately
predict the value of potential claims. Note, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CAL. L. REV.
1615, 1622 (1972).
278 See Vairo, supra note 164, at 179-80.
217 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (interpreting diversity juris-
diction as requiring complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants). In class
actions there must be complete diversity only between the defendant and the named
class representative. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
280 See Vairo, supra note 164, at 179 n.60 ("The number of possible forums in which
a defendant will be amenable to suit has expanded since the Supreme Court announced
the 'minimum contacts' test .... This approach has led to the development of long-arm
statutes greatly expanding the reach of state court jurisdiction.").
28 Id. at 179 ("Because plaintiffs can choose a federal court by structuring the case
to insure complete diversity, Erie permits litigants to engage in state-to.state forum
shopping."). Admittedly, this state-to-state or horizontal forum shopping is not the type
of forum shopping that the Erie doctrine seeks to prevent. Erie addresses the problem of
vertical forum shopping, that is, the choice given a litigant when federal courts enforce
one type of substantive rule and state courts enforce another, even though both courts
are located in the same state. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)
("The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same
transaction the accident of a suit by a nonresident litigant in a federal court instead of in
a State court a block away, should not lead to a substantially different result."). While
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over, since federal courts must apply the state substantive law,
plaintiffs can pursue their case in either the federal or state sys-
tem depending upon which one is procedurally favorable.2 2 Fi-
najly, strict application of the Erie doctrine does not serve to
achieve fundamental fairness in either the asbestos or mass tort
context; if anything, Erie only serves to delay and hinder it.283
Since the underlying justifications for Erie are actually thwarted
by its application in the mass tort context, Erie should not oper-
ate as a limitation on federal courts in asbestos litigation.
b. Bases for Creation of Federal Common Law
Even if one accepts continued application of the Erie doc-
trine to mass torts, there are other arguments to support the
creation of a federal common law in asbestos cases.2 Each state
allowing federal courts to create and apply their own mass tort law would, in effect,
create vertical forum shopping problems, this concern can be practically eliminated. If
federal common law is applied to mass torts, defendants would be able to remove most
state actions to the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. section 1441(b). It provides:
Any civil action of which the district court shall have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1948). With the creation of a federal common law of mass torts
most defendants would qualify for removal, unless the defendant was a resident of the
state where the suit was brought. Not allowing a resident defendant to remove the case
to federal court, however, should not result in any undue unfairness because the defend-
ant would already be aware that it was subject to that state's laws. Moreover, the fact
that removal is impossible in some cases should not deprive the majority of litigants
from enjoying the benefits of a federal rule. See Vairo, supra note 164, at 18$ n.63
("Other litigants should not be denied the opportunity to argue for a federal rule simply
because removal is sometimes impossible.").
" When applied to multi-tort litigation, the Erie doctrine's advantage of pro-
moting uniformity in the administration of the law of a particular state may be
illusory because it may at the same time contribute to state-to-state forum
shopping, which leads to a lack of uniformity. Indeed, federal litigants may
thwart whatever interest State A may have had in applying its law by suing in
State B that would choose to apply either its own law, or the law of yet an-
other state .... It is not the choice of a federal forum, but rather the choice of
a court in State B that creates the equal administration problem.
Vairo, supra note 164, at 179-80.
233 Mullenix, supra note 5, at 1076-77 ("The Erie doctrine has repeatedly proven to
be a major impediment to the fair adjudication of mass-tort claims, a problem that has
captured the attention of federal courts enmeshed in Erie considerations.").
Generally instances in which the imposition of federal common law is justifiable
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involved in asbestos litigation has an interest in promoting the
full recovery of its citizens since any shortfall may force the
state to take steps to care for the injured parties.285 In asbestos
cases, however, the parties and the states are competing for a
finite resource, namely the limited funds available from asbestos
defendants. State conflicts over limited resources have long been
recognized as a sufficient predicate for the imposition of federal
common law.2"' While these cases dealt with the partitioning of
water rights among several states, the underlying rationale of us-
ing federal common law when state law will not resolve the con-
flict is just as valid in the asbestos context.2 87
are "few and restricted." Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
211 Jackson v. Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d 1314, 1330 (5th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
280 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)
(reasoning that the apportionment of a finite resource between states is a matter of fed-
eral common law when the state laws would conflict with one another); Kansas v. Colo-
rado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906) (holding that conflicting state interests over water rights were
appropriate subjects for federal common law since the conflicts could not be resolved by
resort to state law).
287 Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 750 F.2d at 1331-32 (Clark, J., dis-
senting) ("The finite pool of assets available to satisfy an infinite number of claimants is
an identical value to the limited water available to serve many riparian owners.").
It should be noted that the Jackson majority rejected the water rights analogy on
the grounds that the "essential conflict [in these cases] was between states as quasi-
sovereign bodies over shared resources." Id. at 1324. In contrast, the majority held asbes-
tos cases did not involve the rights and duties of states as discrete political entities. Id.
In addition, the court held that asbestos cases were different because the conflict for the
finite resource was not merely between plaintiffs in different states, but also plaintiffs in
the same state and past, present and future plaintiffs.
The majority's first assertion, however, is clearly incorrect. The leading case of Hin-
derlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), which was
decided on the same day as Erie, was an action to enforce the private rights of a Colo-
rado corporation. The majority's claim that the dividing line is whether the states them-
selves are involved in the litigation is unsupported by precedent. Moreover, the majority
misreads the argument used to support the application of federal common law to asbes-
tos claims. The conflict is not one among private parties, but rather among the states as
quasi-sovereigns, because a failure to secure compensation for some injured victims will
force states to make up any shortfall.
The majority's second point is even more tenuous. Surely the court did not mean to
imply that a case involving a conflict over a common body of water would be inappropri-
ate for treatment under federal common law simply because there are multiple plaintiffs
within one or more of the states. If Hinderlider had involved two Colorado corporations
and a New Mexico official instead of a single corporation from Colorado, it is difficult to
imagine the Supreme Court treating the case differently. The underlying justification for
the decision involves "the equitable division of any scarce resource between citizens of
different states where conflicting state interests make the use of either state law inappro-
priate." Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1331 (Clark, J., dissenting). The argument that the situa-
[Vol. 58: 553
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
Federal common law has also been applied where "the inter-
state . .. nature of the controversy makes it inappropriate for
state law to control. ' 288 Asbestos litigation clearly falls within
this holding. Asbestos cases are not limited to any one
state-they are truly a national and interstate phenomena. As of
1991 asbestos cases were pending in eighty-seven separate fed-
eral district courts. 8" Moreover, the adjudication of an asbestos
case in one state will affect litigants in every other state in the
nation.2 90 The interstate nature of asbestos cases is especially
relevant since the sources of compensation capital for asbestos
injuries is finite and will probably prove insufficient to pay all
present and potential claims. 29 1 Accordingly, the national scope
and effect of asbestos cases should make them appropriate can-
didates for the application of federal common law under the Su-
preme Court's holding in Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff Ma-
terial Inc..292
Finally, asbestos litigation can be viewed as implicating suf-
ficiently unique federal interests to justify the creation of a fed-
eral common law.293 The majority in Jackson v. Johns-
tion is somehow different because one state also has multiple parties within the state
contesting the same right borders on the ludicrous.
2 Texas Indust. v. Radcliffe Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
2" See Panel Consolidates Asbestos Cases to Resolve Judicial 'Mess', RaEusas,
July 30, 1991 ("A panel of federal judges upset by the judicial chaos spavned by a flood
of litigation over the health effects of asbestos, has consolidated more than 26,000 asbes-
tos-related cases in a single courtroom .... The cases are now pending in 87 district
courts stretching from Maine, where 39 cases are affected, to Hawaii, where 105 cases
were ordered shifted."). No estimates were available for state courts although given the
fact that over two-thirds of asbestos cases are filed in the state judicial system, it is safe
to assume that cases are currently pending in all fifty states. See supra note 215.
211 See Mullenix, supra note 5, at 1077 ("Jurists and commentators now recognize
that mass-tort lawsuits are nationwide in scope and effect.").
The majority labels this a "Mississippi diversity case." While this is liter-
ally accurate, it is misleading. Jackson is a seminal case that will control the
rights of untold thousands of litigants in this court .... The number of claims
is already legion and increasing at a geometric rate. Compensation for these
actions, most of which are founded on the concept of liability without fault,
must be paid by a finite and indeed limited group of business entities and
insurers. These facts prevent the consideration of James Leroy Jackson's case
in isolation.
Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1329 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
2 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
292 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (recognizing that the interstate nature of a controversy
may provide a sufficient basis for applying federal common law).
293 Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977) ("[In] deciding whether rules of
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Manville29 4 found that the federal courts' interest in "doing jus-
tice" was too all-encompassing and abstract an interest to con-
stitute a unique federal interest. Essentially the court was con-
cerned that recognition of such a broad federal interest as a
basis for the application of federal common law would force fed-
eral courts to create a substantive federal tort law.29 5 What this
concern ignores, however, is the ease with which the court could
have limited its ruling to mass tort cases, such as asbestos,
where federal courts were in real and imminent danger of being
overwhelmed by case filings. 2 6 An additional argument for the
federal common law should be fashioned, normally the guiding principle is that a signifi-
cant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the
premises must first be specifically shown.").
294 Jackson v. Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d 1314, 1325-26 (5th Cir. 1985). The court also
found that adoption of this reasoning as a basis for federal common law would "eviscer-
ate Erie." Id. at 1326. This concern, however, is misplaced in asbestos litigation since the
policies espoused by Erie do not support the application of state law. See supra notes
272-83 and accompanying text.
29 [W]e are unable to discern any governing principle of easy application for
the imposition of federal common law in the asbestos context .... The simple
fact is that, once the need to limit plaintiffs' recoveries is used to justify the
creation of federal substantive rules ... there would be no principled means of
restricting the application of federal common law to other matters, either in
the context of asbestos litigation or in similar legal problems. As a conse-
quence, federal courts would become increasingly responsible for establishing a
federal tort law in a manner we think is inconsistent with the teachings of Erie
and the logic behind our federal system.
Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1326-27.
The majority based its holding largely on the Supreme Court's decision in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945), which rejected the argument that the equita-
ble powers of federal courts constituted an exception to the Erie doctrine.
But since a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because of
the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only
another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is
made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement
of the right as given by the state.
Id.
I 9 The dissent in Jackson focused on the unique circumstances of asbestos litiga-
tion as setting it apart from other types of cases and warranting imposition of a federal
common law.
In sum, the asbestos-related litigation presents a flood of interrelated actions
which cannot properly be decided as individual actions or under the legal rules
of any single state. Unless the dependent rights of all present and future claim-
ants are considered by the only forum capable of devising a single appropriate
response to basic issues that affect the economic vitality of the compensation
fund, disparate awards to early claimants can destroy the courts' ability to do
justice. The asbestos litigation presents one of the few and restricted instances
where the formulation of federal common law is justified under the strictures
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creation of a federal common law is based on the unique federal
interest embodied in regulating interstate commerce and in in-
suring the solvency of asbestos defendants who are frequently
companies of national and international stature.0 7
The second prong for the imposition of federal common law
is that there must be a conflict between the federal interest and
the use of state law.29 8 State law clearly does conflict with the
interest of federal courts in achieving justice in asbestos litiga-
tion. Defendants are subject to a variety of governing laws on
substantive issues, similarly situated plaintiffs are subject to un-
equal recoveries and there is a real danger of some victims being
left uncompensated. 99
At the very least the question of whether state or federal
law should apply to asbestos cases should be certified to the Su-
preme Court as the dissenters in Jackson suggested.300 The Su-
preme Court, alone, has the power to answer authoritatively the
issue of federal common law once and for all. Moreover, recent
developments in connection with asbestos litigation, such as
Chief Justice Rehnquist's approval of the Ad Hoc Committee's
Report,30 1 indicate that there is a growing awareness by Court
members of the national scope of the asbestos crisis and the ur-
defined by existing precedent.
Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1335 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
207 See Vairo, supra note 164, at 203 ("In the context of multi-tort cases, the com-
merce clause, the federal regulatory statutes, and the equal protection clause provide the
basis for Congress and the federal courts to find sufficient federal interest to support the
application of federal law."). Under this argument, federal statutes regulating interstate
commerce provide sufficient evidence of a federal interest sufficient to impose a federal
common law in the mass tort context. Id. at 206. Thus, whenever an interstate harm is
caused by a product subject to such regulation, courts could apply federal common law.
Id.
298 See Miree v. Dekalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
193 See supra notes 199-204.
300 750 F.2d at 1330 (Clark C.J., dissenting). Certification of questions of law to the
Supreme Court is authorized by 28 U.S.C. section 1254(2) which provides:
Cases in the court of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the
following methods:
(2) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in
any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon such
certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the
entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.
Id.
301 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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gent need for some type of immediate remedial action. 2
D. Settlement of Limited Fund Class Actions
The treatment of asbestos litigation through a mandatory
class action device also raises concerns about the ability of
judges to cope with such complex litigation. While the proper
role of judges in handling civil litigation and the controversy
that has arisen over "managerial judging" is beyond the scope of
this Comment, 0 3 the policy considerations implicated by settle-
ments of mass tort class actions present particular problems that
must be addressed.
It is widely accepted that most civil litigations settle before
trials 4 and this general trend has been mirrored in asbestos liti-
gation 0 5 Yet there is a substantial difference between the set-
tlement of a mass tort class action and the settlement of a tradi-
tional tort case. First, mass tort cases themselves force courts to
undertake different approaches to settlement. Under the tradi-
tional model, settlement is typically reached by the parties with
little or no judicial involvement.0o In mass tort class actions,
however, the litigation can be much more complex, involve un-
certain legal issues, require the evaluation of extensive amounts
of technical information and involve multiple parties as plain-
"02 Although Judge Weinstein's decision that federal common law was inappropriate
in the Manville class action was understandable in iight of past decisions in Jackson v.
Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) and In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), the court should have attempted to apply federal
common law. Even if the Second Circuit reversed Judge Weinstein on this issue, the
parties would have had an opportunity to appeal to the Supreme Court and thus conclu-
sively resolve the issue. The difficulty with this course of action for Judge Weinstein was
that delay in compensating the injured parties would have been lengthened.
303 The controversy over managerial judging has engendered a considerable amount
of commentary both pro and con. In 1986 the University of Chicago sponsored a sympo-
sium on litigation management that resulted in several articles on the subject. See E.
Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Cm. L. REV.
306 (1986); Francis E. McGovern, Towards a Functional Approach for Managing Com-
plex Litigation, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 440 (1986); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudica-
tory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 494 (1986).
30. See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent
Orange Example, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 337 (1986).
30. See supra note 53.
... Rule 16 allows federal courts to hold, at its discretion, pretrial conferences for a
variety of reasons, including facilitating the settlement of the case. See FED R. Civ. P.
16(a)(5) & (c)(7).
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tiffs and defendants.0 To help cope with all these management
difficulties, courts frequently employ special masters,308 court-
appointed experts, 309 federal magistrates and a host of other
staff personnel.3 10 The court itself may also become intimately
involved in the settlement negotiations. 31'
Second, Rule 23(e) requires federal courts to approve any
settlement of a class action.312 This requirement has been inter-
preted as compelling federal courts to review and to insure that
the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.3 3 No such re-
view power exists in the traditional model.
Finally, the nature of the settlement and the parties reac-
tions to it differ greatly. In a traditional tort case settlement is
achieved by a consensual agreement among the parties. In the
class action context, however, there are frequently members of
the class who oppose the settlement and yet are still bound by
it. 314 This possibility raises questions of whether it is fundamen-
30I Manville is one of the best examples of this type of case. It presents the court
not only with difficult legal issues, a morass of relevant data to be digested and a multi-
plicity of parties, but also presents these logistical nightmares in the context of the larger
national judicial crisis of asbestos litigation.
308 See supra note 57.
309 Id.
310 To manage the Agent Orange case effectively, Judge Weinstein was forced to
expand his own chambers' staff and to bring in a number of outside consultants and
attorneys to act as special masters.
In order to manage the case, Judge Weinstein found it necessary to create a
special bureaucracy within his own chambers. In addition to hiring extra law
clerks and paralegals and assigning a federal magistrate to the case, he ap-
pointed no fewer than seven special masters (four or five of them working si-
multaneously) to assist him-and the masters themselves sometimes turned to
paid consultants for help.
Schuck, supra note 304, at 342.
31 Id. at 351-59 (describing the extensive efforts undertaken by Judge Weinstein in
the settlement of the Agent Orange litigation).
312 See supra note 151.
13 See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1323 (2d Cir.
1990) ("In order to protect the interests of the class members, the court must 'closely
and carefully scrutinize the... settlement proposal to make sure that it [is] fair, ade-
quate and reasonable.... ."' (citing Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 658 (2d
Cir. 1982)).
314 This problem is even more pronounced when the case involves a mandatory class
action because the parties do not have the right to opt out. Thus they cannot be consid-
ered as having waived their right to object to the settlement of the action.
In contrast, class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) allow parties to opt out of the litiga-
tion at their discretion. Some courts have interpreted a plaintiff's failure to exercise the
opt out right as an implied consent to any subsequent judgment or settlement of the
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tally unfair to enforce a settlement against a party who never
consented to it. When these three factors are considered to-
gether, the danger of improper, non-neutral behavior by the su-
pervising court becomes a real possibility. One legal commenta-
tor has created three labels to represent the risks imposed by
active judicial involvement in the settlement of complex cases:
judicial over-reaching, judicial over-commitment and procedural
unfairness.15
"Judicial over-reaching" occurs when judges use their power
over the issues in the litigation or their potential power over the
attorneys in the current or subsequent cases, to coerce the par-
ties into settlement i.31  The danger of such improper judicial be-
action. See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
This problem was clearly evident in Manville where entire categories of class mem-
bers adamantly opposed the settlement throughout the proceedings and at least 50% of
the class members who had current claims against the Trust also opposed the settlement.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
315 See Schuck, supra note 304, at 359.
316 [Jludges control inducements that they can manipulate in order to influence
lawyers' behavior. Even if judges scrupulously avoid rewarding or punishing
lawyers who do or do not cooperate in effecting settlement, the danger remains
that the lawyers will interpret judicial involvement as thinly-veiled coercion or
will conform their behavior to what they believe the judge is demanding rather
than to the needs of their clients.
Id. at 359-60. Professor Schuck provides a fascinating example of this problem in the
Agent Orange case where at least one attorney claimed that Judge Weinstein pressured
him or, at least, gave the impression of pressuring him into settlement. Id. at 360.
[Jiudicial zeal for settlement is a problem. Judges make many decisions after
the pretrial settlement conference. The temptation to reward lawyers who co-
operate and punish lawyers who do not cooperate is always present. The
stronger the commitment of the judge to settlement, the greater the tempta-
tion. Even if judges do not use settlement acts as a basis for reward or punish-
ment, lawyers will fear the possibility in the present case or in future cases.
Leroy J. Tornquist, The Active Judge in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone
Awry, 25 WMLAMErr L. REV. 743, 771-72 (1989).
Due to the particular nature of asbestos litigation, it should be noted that the power
of coercion runs both ways. Attorneys or law firms frequently can be involved in a num-
ber of asbestos suits at one time. This gives them a measure of retaliatory power if a
judge oversteps or is perceived to have overstepped his or her bounds in one of the cases.
Judge Weinstein has had first-hand experience with this type of party coercion when
plaintiffs' attorney in the Eagle-Pitcher asbestos litigation threatened to stall settlement
negotiations in Manville unless an unfavorable ruling was reversed.
By all accounts the battle has now become one between Judge Weinstein and
the plaintiffs' lawyers. In his moves to slash legal fees and temporarily freeze
payments by asbestos defendants to lawyers and their clients, the judge has
achieved something that had been considered impossible. He has unified what
was a highly divided plaintiff's bar, which is now together in its enmity for
him. So enraged were they last week about his rulings in one big asbestos
[Vol. 58:553
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
havior is exacerbated by the fact that settlement negotiations
take place "behind closed doors in a highly-charged emotional
environment" where the threat of misunderstandings between
parties is much higher.317 The second risk identified as "judicial
over-commitment" concerns the neutrality of the court in ap-
proving the settlement as fair, adequate and reasonable under
Rule 23(e). s18 The more time and resources that a judge contrib-
utes toward the creation of a settlement the more the judge may
become committed to approving the settlement regardless of
whether it meets the standards of Rule 23.310 The final concern
is "procedural unfairness"; it involves the mandates of the Due
Process Clause and the nature of the settlement negotiations
themselves.320 Settlement negotiations are, due to their very na-
ture, secretive and relatively informal functions that are "ill-
suited to the conventional forms of procedural due process. 3 21
Thus, for example, numerous ex parte communications may
take place between some of the attorneys and the judge or the
judge's staff that might violate normal procedural safeguards. 22
case-the proposed class action of Eagle-Pitcher Industries-that they
threatened to break off negotiations in a different case, which involves the re-
structuring of the ailing trust set up two years ago by the Manville Corporation
.... Now, Judge Weinstein is preparing to pull back from his ruling in Eagle-
Pitcher. He is expected at a hearing today to effectively rescind an order that
had blocked the company from making payments on the asbestos cases.
Labaton, supra note 3, at D2.
, See Schuck, supra note 304, at 360.
3,6 Id. at 361.
319 In effect Professor Schuck argues that there is a danger that judges will compro-
mise their neutrality in the settlement process because they are so intimately involved in
the creation and negotiation of settlement itself. Id. Schuck also identifies another possi-
ble factor contributing to the loss of judicial neutrality in approval of settlements;
namely, the fact that the judge may have "staked his reputation and authority on his
ability to craft a settlement that would terminate the dispute." Id. at 362. See also Torn-
quist, supra note 316, at 760-61 ("A judge who helps fashion a settlement is not in a
good position to evaluate the fairness of that settlement. As a judge becomes more active
in creating the settlement, the judge is less likely to be objective in reviewing the
settlement").
30 Schuck, supra note 304, at 362-63.
32 Id. at 362.
3 Id. at 363 (describing the ex parte communications which took place between
Judge Weinstein, his staff and the lawyers in the case). Canon 3A(4) of the A.B.. Code
of Judicial Conduct provides: "A judge should . . . except as authorized by the law,
neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending...
proceeding." Id. The purpose of this provision is to assure that all parties know what
others have told the judge and to allow an opportunity for rebuttal. That policy seems
applicable in settlement conferences with trial judges, especially if the judge is going to
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The end result of this procedural unfairness is only to exacer-
bate the danger of judicial overreaching and over-commitment
to settlement.2
3
Having identified the potential danger areas, the question
then becomes what can be done to minimize them. Just admit-
ting that there are drawbacks to judicial involvement in the set-
tlement process is an important first step. By outlining the pos-
sible hazards, legal commentators will make judges more aware
of their power in settlement negotiations and the potential
abuses of such power. 24 Commentators, however, have also pro-
posed specific procedural remedies to guard against the dangers
of judicial impropriety.2 s One proposal is that one judge should
be used for the settlement portion of the litigation and another
for the trial on the merits. 26 In addition, the proposal precludes
judges involved in settlement negotiations from ruling on the
fairness of the settlement under Rule 23(e).3 27
While the proposals have merit, their potential drawbacks
seem to outweigh any possible utility, especially in complex
mass tort cases. First, these remedies would impose a serious,
additional strain on scarce judicial resources.2 s Moreover, by re-
hear the case. See Tornquist, supra note 316, at 758-59.
323 See Schuck, supra note 304, at 362 ("The risk of procedural unfairness-the
threat to procedural values such as accuracy, individual dignity, participation, openness
of decision making, and the like-magnifies the risks of judicial overreaching and
overcommitment."). The use of Professor Schuck's three risk categories in connection
with active judicial involvement in the settlement process is not meant to imply that
they are the only concerns to which such situations give rise. Other commentators have
identified a number of other potential problem areas as well. See, e.g., Tornquist, supra
note 316 (identifying 11 different concerns with judicial participation in pretrial settle-
ment). Professor Schuck's approach, however, provides a sufficiently in-depth introduc-
tion to familiarize the reader with the possible dangers of judicial involvement in
settlements.
324 See Schuck, supra note 304, at 365.
325 Id. at 364-65; Tornquist, supra note 316, at 773-74.
326 Schuck, supra note 304, at 364; Tornquist, supra note 316, at 773. Both profes-
sors, however, concede that this approach may not eliminate the problem since the risk
of overcommitment may simply shift from the "merit" judge to the "settlement" judge.
Id. Moreover, this approach would place even greater demands on the system for scarce
judicial resources. Schuck, supra note 304, at 364.
327 Schuck, supra note 304, at 364-65; Tornquist, supra note 316, at 773. Professor
Schuck, however, concedes that it may be difficult to draw the distinction between
judges who take an active part in the settlement process and those who are only periph-
erally involved. Schuck, supra note 304, at 364.
338 See supra note 326. The difficulty caused by the drain on judicial resources
should not be dismissed lightly. Given the complexity and size of the typical mass tort
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moving the "settlement" judge's power over the merits of the
case or the approval of the settlement, his or her capacity to
induce settlement among the parties is diminished 2 ' Finally, it
is questionable that the separation of judges into different
spheres would succeed in limiting overreaching or over-commit-
ment because the judges would, most likely, work closely to-
gether on the case33 0 Reaction to these proposals depends, in
litigation, barring "settlement" judges from taking part in the "merit" portion of the
trial or ruling on the fairness of the settlement would entail not only familiarizing two
judges with the intricacies of the litigation; it would also require the creation of two
separate bureaucracies because each judge would need additional staff and consultants to
provide support in handling his or her aspect of the case. See Schuck, supra note 304, at
342-43 (describing the host of assistants, staff and consultants needed by Judge Wein-
stein to adequately deal with the complexity of the Agent Orange case).
Separate staff would be required because of the real, albeit subtle, influence of court
personnel on judicial decisions. Thus, if there is a shared staff and part of their job is to
facilitate settlement, they will be able to influence the merit or approval judge's deci-
sions. Essentially, with a common staff, one runs the risk of replacing judicial overcom-
mitment to settlement with staff overcommitment.
=1 As Professor Schuck pointed out, a judge's power to make preliminary rulings on
the issues and to indicate or signal how he or she would rule on other relevant questions
can play a large role in inducing the parties to settle the litigation. See Schuck, supra
note 304, at 351-52. The motivation behind depriving a judge involved in the settlement
process of the power to rule on substantive issues appears to be an attempt to restrict
instances of judicial overreaching. Id. at 359-60.
While this goal is laudable, it is difficult to see how a "settlement" judge would
differ in any significant respects from a special master appointed to facilitate settlement
among the parties. In Agent Orange Judge Weinstein employed special masters to draft
and negotiate settlement plans. Id. at 344. Similar special masters also took part in the
negotiation process in Manville. See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Li-
tig., 129 B.R. 710, 849 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The courts were fortunate to have the
skilled services of Leon Silverman, advisor to the bankruptcy court [and the limited fund
special master] and his partner Matthew Gluck, who provided extraordinary assistance
to the parties during settlement negotiations."). By depriving judges of a good deal of
their power over the substantive issues in the case, their status as negotiators is effec-
tively reduced to that of just another special master.
It must be conceded, however, that "settlement" judges do have one coercive power
that special masters lack; they can still threaten to retaliate against uncooperative attor-
neys in other cases in which the attorneys might appear before the judge.
The essential, unvarnished fact is this: The lawyers know -and the judge
knows the lawyers know-that the judge is in position to make many decisions
of vital concern to them and their clients in the future, both in this case and in
subsequent cases in which they will appear before that judge.
Schuck, supra note 304, at 358.
Thus the use of separate "settlement" judges goes both too far and, at the same
time, does not go far enough. The judges are deprived, to a large extent, of their power to
induce settlement and yet retain means of applying significant amounts of coercion.
10 Although neither Professor Schuck nor Professor Tornquist address the issue,
there remains the possibility that settlement and merit judges would work so closely with
19921
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
large part, on the attitude one takes towards active judges on
the whole and whether they really contribute to the settlement
process. It is significant, however, that most attorneys believe
that active judicial involvement in settlement negotiations is
both effective and desirable. 31 Since attorneys and their clients
are the ones most at risk from judicial misconduct in the settle-
ment process, the fact that they favor such involvement suggests
that it would be best to follow an old maxim on the issue of
procedural reform-"if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Nevertheless,
because the danger is real, judges and other members of the le-
gal profession should be aware of the possibility of judicial im-
propriety and, if it becomes a serious problem, should not hesi-
tate to take corrective action.332
CONCLUSION
Essentially this Comment proposes two steps to help allevi-
ate the asbestos crisis. The first is to make wider use of
mandatory class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). The second
step, which is largely an effort to facilitate the use of such class
actions, contemplates the creation of a federal common law for
mass torts. It must be conceded that these "reforms" are any-
thing but simple. The widespread use of class actions goes di-
rectly against the traditional belief in our society that each per-
one another that they would give attorneys the impression that failure to cooperate with
one would result in retaliation by the other. Moreover, if the judges did work closely with
one another, which is only to be expected in complex cases, they may, in fact, influence
one another in their rulings. Thus if the settlement judge was having difficulty with a
particular party, he or she may discuss the problem with the merit judge, if only infor-
mally, and by doing so subtly influence the other judge's perception of that party. As a
result, the merit judge may give less leeway or "retaliate" against that party in later
stages of the trial.
" Eighty-five percent of 1886 lawyers responding to an ABA questionnaire
agreed that "involvement by federal judges in settlement discussions [is) likely
to significantly improve the prospects for achieving settlement." Nearly three
of every four lawyers polled in the survey endorsed the view that a settlement
conference hosted by a judge should be mandatory.
Tornquist, supra note 316, at 768-69.
332 Professor Schuck admirably summarized this approach:
More important, we must seek to strengthen the normative and institutional
safeguards upon which any judicial system must principally rely: the self-con-
sciousness of judges, the vigilance and assertiveness of advocates, the probing
suspicion of journalists, and the fastidious carping of scholars.
Schuck, supra note 304, at 365.
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son deserves his or her day in court. The creation of a federal
common law of torts, no matter how limited, goes directly
against the teachings of Erie and our federalist system. Why
then should we take such drastic actions? The most obvious re-
sponse is because the current system is just not working and
something must be done. The question then becomes whether
these two steps are the appropriate response.
There should be no illusions surrounding the use of
mandatory class actions in the asbestos and mass tort context.
By expanding the use of class actions courts will deprive liti-
gants of much control over their individual cases. The litigation
will become more complex; it will take longer to resolve than
individual cases; and it will require active judicial involvement
in all aspects of the case.
Despite this, however, it is clear that the benefits of using
mandatory class actions outweigh the drawbacks. Class actions
will speed the resolution of mass tort litigations and thus relieve
a great deal of the pressure on the state and federal court sys-
tems. Nor are the justifications for the expanded use of class ac-
tions limited to utility and convenience. By more efficiently us-
ing scarce judicial resources by aggregating cases for trial,
mandatory class actions will limit the parties' transaction costs
that will, in turn, preserve a larger amount of capital to compen-
sate victims of asbestos. Moreover, class actions enable the par-
ties to reach comprehensive, global settlements in a single litiga-
tion instead of endlessly repeating essentially the same case over
and over. Finally, given the fact that the capital available to
compensate asbestos victims is so limited, class actions represent
one of the few ways to ensure that these funds are equitably
distributed among deserving claimants. All of these factors mean
that class actions allow courts to achieve justice more quickly,
more comprehensively and more definitely.
The problem, however, is that the first step of making wider
use of class actions in the asbestos and mass tort context is prac-
tically impossible unless the second step-establishing a federal
common law of mass torts-is also taken. Manville is a prime
example of the difficulty of using class actions under current
law. As it now stands there is no single uniform law that courts
can apply to resolve disputes which arise in litigation even when
those disputes arise as part of a settlement agreement, as in
Manville. Current law is a crazy patchwork of state standards
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where one rule applies to some litigants and different rules to
others. Courts just cannot effectively use class actions without a
single uniform standard that will apply to all parties in the case,
regardless of what state their claim arose in or where the party
is domiciled. Moreover, there are only a limited number of ways
that a single governing law can be established. The simplest an-
swer to the "applicable law" dilemma appears to be some form
of national legislation. It is clear, however, that such action is so
highly improbable at the current time as to be all but dismissed
as a viable possibility. The reality of the situation is that federal
and state courts are facing a crisis and, apparently, only the
courts have both the ability and the resolve to deal adequately
with it.
To achieve some sort of solution to the asbestos epidemic,
courts should simply create a federal common law of mass torts.
That course of action represents the most effective answer to the
applicable law dilemma. Unfortunately, it is not simply a matter
of changing the way courts approach these cases. To accomplish
this vital second step, federal courts will have to deviate from
the long-standing policy of Erie, which requires them to avoid
creating a federal common law of torts. It should be recognized,
however, that a deviation is justified by the .unique circum-
stances surrounding asbestos litigation. The traditional argu-
ments that militate against the creation of a federal common law
of torts simply do not apply to the mass tort context. Forum
shopping by plaintiffs is already widespread in the existing sys-
tem, uniformity of applicable law is impossible in all but the
smallest cases and justice is, at best, delayed and, more fre-
quently, circumvented altogether. It is obvious to all but the
most ardent traditionalists that Erie and the current system do
not work in the asbestos litigation context. Moreover, the crea-
tion of a federal mass tort law will do just what Erie seeks to do
in the traditional tort case; it will discourage forum shopping,
promote the uniform application of the laws and effectuate jus-
tice for victims.
Critics of this approach raise the concern that by allowing
the creation of a federal mass tort law, courts will find them-
selves on a slippery slope, leading inevitably to the creation of a
federal law for all tort litigation. This concern, while legitimate,
ignores the unique characteristics of mass tort litigation. These
cases are national in scope and nature. They involve enormous
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numbers of parties with different and often conflicting rights. A
simple one-on-one tort case is an entirely different creature. Cer-
tainly there is -no danger in confusing a two party tort lawsuit
between motorists in New York City with mass tort litigation of
Manville's magnitude. A federal law of torts could easily be lim-
ited to mass tort situations, such as the one involving Manville.
Finally, the Erie prohibition against the creation of a fed-
eral common law of torts was first announced over fifty years
ago. It may have been the correct course for courts to follow at
that time, but our society and economy have undergone enor-
mous transformations since 1938. Today we live in a society
where most goods are mass produced and mass marketed. It is
inevitable that some of these goods will be defective or harmful
and that large numbers of people will be injured as a result. As-
bestos may be the most urgent example right now, but there will
be others in the future whether they are a defective drug like
DES333 or a harmful product like Agent Orange.3 34 Courts must
find a way to deal with this kind of litigation in an equitable
manner and the class action device represents one of the most
potent answers in the federal arsenal. To make wider use of class
actions, though, courts must also change the law. This is not a
step to be taken lightly. The law, hdwever, is not a static entity;
it too must change to reflect the realities that confront our soci-
ety. The reality of asbestos litigation is that thousands of vic-
tims remain uncompensated and thousands more are in danger
of losing any chance at being compensated at all. The reality is
that the traditional tort system simply does not work and Con-
gress seems to lack the will or resolve to initiate the necessary
legislation. The reality is that something must be done and
courts, as the final forum for thousands of asbestos victims,
should not hesitate to step into the breach and fashion their own
reforms.
Steven L. Schultz
AUTHOR'S NOTE
On December 4, 1992 the Second Circuit, in a lengthy opin-
ion authored by Judge Jon 0. Newman, vacated and remanded
I Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979).
In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the trial courts' decision in Manville.33 5 Although the parties
had raised no less than eleven separate objections to the use of
the limited fund class action and the Settlement itself on ap-
peal, 3 6 the Second Circuit based its vacatur on only two
grounds. First, the court found that the inclusion of all the par-
ties in a single comprehensive class violated the dictates of Rule
23 (a)(3) and (4).337 In addition, the court held that the Settle-
"' In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781 (2d Cir.
Dec. 4, 1992). Judge Newman's 73-page majority decision was joined by Judge Winter.
Judge Feinberg filed a separate 18 page opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Id. at *32.
Throughout the Second Circuit's decision, the district court and bankruptcy court
are collectively referred to as "the Trial Courts." See id. at *5. To avoid any unnecessary
confusion, those terms have been adopted in this postscript.
33' The most compelling objections to Judge Weinstein's approval of the Settlement
came from the codefendants who had raised two issues on appeal. First, they claimed
that the class definition had improperly grouped them together with the health claim-
ants and in so doing, disregarded the fundamental adversity of interests between the two
groups. Id. at *10. In addition, the codefendants attacked section H of the Settlement as
unlawfully impairing their state law rights and being fatally imprecise. Id.
The health claimants, those parties with personal injury or wrongful death claims,
raised nine separate grounds on appeal including claims that:
(1) the Manville court had acted beyond its judicial authority in developing
and engineering the adoption of a legislative solution to the financial difficul-
ties of the Trust.
(2) the court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction.
(3) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over absent asbestos disease
plaintiffs.
(4) the Settlement violated the Bankruptcy Code by modifying a confirmed
and substantially consummated plan of Reorganization in violation of 11
U.S.C. section 1127(b).
(5) even if the court had authority to modify the reorganization plan, the Set-
tlement violated specific provisions of the code, notably the requirement that
members of each class receive the same treatment under 11 U.S.C. section
1123(a)(4).
(6) the Settlement denied health claimants their right to procedural Due Pro-
cess and violated the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 because of defects in
class notice, lack of an adequate opportunity to be heard, lack of appropriate
subclasses and lack of an opportunity to opt out of the class. (7) the Settle-
ment was unfair.
(8) the orders respecting state court actions violated the Anti-injunction Act,
28 U.S.C. section 2283, and exceeded the court's authority under the All-Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. section 1651.
(9) the court had erred in denying the fee application of the firm of Henderson
and Goldberg.
Id. at *10-11.
"' Rule 23 (a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties
[be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3); see supra
notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
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ment of the class action had improperly modified a confirmed
and substantially consummated plan of reorganization in viola-
tion of section 1127(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 33 18 At the same
time the Second Circuit declined to decide a number of relevant
issues, including the validity of the uniform provisions contained
in section H of the Settlement.339 Moreover, the failure of the
Second Circuit to address this central issue was compounded by
its more generalized failure to provide any real substantive guid-
ance to the district court on remand.34 0 In the final analysis, the
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see supra notes 134-38 and
accompanying text.
In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at *30.
While the interaction between bankruptcy law and the use of class actions was of para-
mount importance in Manville, this article focuses exclusively on the implications of the
Second Circuit's decision on the use of class actions in asbestos and mass tort litigation.
m9 Id. at *20 ("Since we hold that the inclusion of both groups [codefendants and
health claim plaintiffs] within a single class violates the requirements of Rule 23, we
need not consider the related issue on the merits of whether the provisions of Section H
improperly impair[ed] state law rights.").
Other issues left open by the Second Circuit on remand included whether the dis-
trict court could lawfully alter the rights of beneficiaries under New York trust law, id.
at *25, and whether the division of health claimants into differently treated subgroups
complied with section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at *30.
310 Responding to that lack of direction, Judge Weinstein issued a Memorandum
and Order on December 7, 1992 advising the parties to consider a number of questions
that the Second Circuit's opinion had raised, but failed to answer. See In re Joint East-
ern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., No. CV-90-3973 (order advising parties about the
Second Circuit decision). The list of questions spanned some five pages of text. Id. at 5-
9.
On the isolated issue of whether a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action was an appropriate
mechanism for handling the Manville case, Judge Weinstein directed the parties to con-
sider the following issues:
(1) Is Rule 23(b)(1)(B) a viable option for settlement?
(2) How many and what subclasses of health claimants should be certified in a
non-opt out class action?
(3) Since all attorneys represent many claimants in all proposed subclasses, is
it possible for any knowledgeable attorney to represent a subclass without un-
acceptable conflicts of interest?
(4) [If there is an] inherent conflict because some less seriously injured persons
will ultimately suffer from serious cancers in view of the latency problem and
some will prefer to leave more money in the Trust for more serious diseases
rather than to collect now for current less serious impairments.
(5) [Whether] the ethical problems posed by the opinion preclude use of
23(b)(1)(B) even though the opinion "skeptically"... and reluctantly agrees
-.. that a 23(b)(1)(B) class action is appropriate in the Second Circuit?
(6) Should there be a separate subclass or subclasses for future claimants?
(7) Who shall represent the future claims subclass or subcloaes?
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Second Circuit's opinion ultimately raises more questions than it
answers.
Despite the vacatur of the Manville Settlement, the court's
decision did represent an important initial step in asbestos liti-
gation. For the first time, the Second Circuit explicitly approved
the use of mandatory class actions in the asbestos context, '34 1
and by doing so, opened the way for federal judges to make
wider use of such mechanisms to deal with the asbestos crisis.
Thus, under the appellate court's decision, judges can use "lim-
ited fund" class actions to speed the resolution of asbestos cases,
control spiraling transaction costs and insure a more equitable
distribution of limited compensation capital.3 42 Moreover, the
potentially positive effects of the court's decision are not merely
limited to the asbestos context; all types of mass tort litigation
may qualify for and benefit from similar class action treatment.
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit's determination that the
original Manville class violated the typicality and adequacy of
representation requirements of Rule 23(a) poses a substantial
(8) What other classes are required in addition to the codefendant manufactur-
ers... and others such as the MacArthur Company... a distributor?
(9) Who shall represent them?
(10) What is the validity of Section H provisions covering these classes or sub-
classes as to which the opinion refrained from "intimating any views with re-
spect to substantive validity?"
(11) Shall a special master or advisor be appointed to assist the parties in
resolving differences?
(12) How can further delays on appeal and in the trial court be avoided?
(13) How can the work of the Trust in settling cases under the Settlement be
utilized without waste of more than a year's effort by the Trust and claimants?
Id. at 5-7.
3," While the Second Circuit ultimately approved the use of a limited fund class
action in Manville, its approval could only be characterized as reluctant. In re Joint
Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at *16 (describing the
court's hesitancy in permitting the use of a mandatory non-opt out class in the Manville
proceedings).
Surprisingly, the appellate court appeared to be primarily concerned with the possi-
bility that courts would use the settlement of asbestos class actions to circumvent the
protections afforded by bankruptcy law. Id. at *24. Thus, the court stressed that the
Manville case did not present the classic instance of a limited fund, because the "AH"
Trust was an insolvent entity to which bankruptcy law would normally apply. Id. at *14.
Despite this distinction, however, Judge Newman felt that the court was bound by Sec-
ond Circuit precedent which allowed the use of mandatory class actions in an insolvency
context. Id. at *18; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.
1992).
",2 For a more general discussion of the potential benefits of using mandatory class
actions in the asbestos context, see supra notes 233-48 and accompanying text.
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impediment to the effective use of the class action device. By
mandating that different subclasses be established for codefend-
ants,s13 third party defendants3" and four separate groups of
health claimants,' 5 the court may have fragmented the
'43 In determining that a separate subclass was required for the codefendants, the
appellate court found that the codefendants and health claim plaintiffs had a number of
adverse interests which prevented the class representatives from meeting the typicality
and adequate representation requirements under Rule 23(a). In re Joint Eastern and
Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at '19; see supra notes 128-40 and ac-
companying text. Those adverse interest included a long history of antagonism between
the two groups in asbestos litigation, see supra note 130, as well as an "overwhelming"
conflict in connection with the uniform provisions of section H of the Settlement. In re
Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at "19.
"' The court also required that a separate subclass be established for at least one
third party defendant, the MacArthur Company, a former distributor of Manville asbes-
tos products. Id. at *21. The court found that the codefendants had aserted the position
in various lawsuits that the MacArthur Company, as opposed to the codefendants, was
responsible for Manville's share of liability to asbestos victims. Id. Accordingly, the court
held that there was an adversity of interests that prevented any of the codefendant's
subclass counsel from adequately representing the former distributor on remand. Id.
Thus, a separate subclass for the MacArthur Company itself was required.
The appellate court, however, did not address whether similar subclasses would be
required in connection with other former distributors or users of Manville products.
'4 The court found that no less than four separate subclases were required among
the health claimants to insure adequate representation in a class action context.
First, the court identified two distinct groups under the payment procedure of the
original reorganization plan. According to the court, those plaintiffs who were accorded a
high priority under the Trust's 1986 first-in, first-out ("FIFO") distribution plan had
directly conflicting interests with those plaintiffs who had later filing dates and were thus
exposed to a substantial risk of non-payment. Id. at *22. In short, the court found that
the first group would prefer to preserve the FIFO order of payments, while latter filing
plaintiffs would prefer the new distribution process contained in the class action settle-
ment. The court held that this adversity of interest was sufficient to warrant the creation
of distinct subclasses. Id. at *21 ("Plainly, the members of each of these sub.roups have
sharply conflicting interests with respect to the maintenance of the order-of-filing prior-
ity."). Id.
In addition, the court found that the Settlement's new distribution process created
identifiable subgroups that also required the further division of the subclasses. Id. Under
the Settlement, health claimants were divided into two groups; those with serious or
fatal diseases were placed in Level One, while claimants with less critical illnesses were
placed in Level Two. Id. at *7; see supra note 88. Generally, Level One claimants were to
be given priority in the distribution of the Trust's limited asets. In re Joint Eastern
and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at '7. Thus, under the Settlement,
Level One claimants would begin receiving compensation two years before the less seri-
ously injured claimants in Level Two. The court found that this two year delay, and the
attendant risk that level two claimants may receive a reduced amount of the value of
their claims, provided sufficiently conflicting interests to justify treating each group as a
separate subclass. Id. at '21.
Thus, the court required that the trial courts establish no fewer than four separate
subclasses among the health claimants on remand.
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Manville class to such an extent that a single, comprehensive
solution to the litigation is no longer possible .43  At the least, the
practical difficulties raised by the Second Circuit's insistence on
a minimum of six separate subclasses are daunting and may
eventually prove only to make the resolution of the Manville
case both more difficult and more expensive. 47 While it is obvi-
ous that some groups within the Manville class had sufficiently
adverse interest so as to justify the imposition of subclasses,34
the Second Circuit failed to provide any adequate standard for
the trial courts to use in making that determination on re-
mand.3 4 9 By imposing subclasses as a procedural prerequisite to
Initially the health claimants must be divided into subclasses comprising
those whose priority under the original payment procedures would have enti-
tled them to full payment and those whose later priority would have resulted
in no payments at all, because of the insufficiency of the Trust's resources ....
Once the health claimants have been divided into two priority-of-payment sub-
classes, a further sub-division of each subclass is required to reflect the Settle-
ment's division of health claimants between Level One and Level Two.
Id. at *24. Judge Feinberg dissented from that portion of the majority opinion requiring
the establishment of subclasses among the health claimants. Id. at *38.
"0 Indeed, it was this very fear that led the trial courts to decline using subclasses
in the original class action proceeding and settlement. See supra note 113.
347 Barbara Franklin, Class Action Confusion: Remand of Manville Plan Leaves Is-
sues Unresolved, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 10, 1992, at 5 ("[T]he appellate court's suggestion for
breaking into at least six different sub-classes the class of health claimants and co-de-
fendant asbestos manufacturers raises practical problems for the lower court and is ex-
pected to make the ultimate solution even more costly.").
m46 Given the prejudicial effect of section H on the substantive rights of the code-
fendants, the appellate court's determination that a separate subclass was required for
those parties is difficult to take issue with.
The co-defendant manufacturers assert that the effect of Section H is to shift
hundreds of millions of dollars of Manville asbestos liability to the co-defend-
ants. Whether or not that adjustment is "fair" and whether or not it can be
made in disregard of applicable state law, it surely cannot be made in a settle-
ment on behalf of a single class that includes both the health claimants and
the co-defendant manufacturers. The conflict is overwhelming.
In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at *19.
341 The Second Circuit held that "[n]o members of a significant subclass can be
mandatorily bound by the consent of 'representatives' in the context of this litigation
unless those representatives have undivided loyalty only to subclass members." Id, at
*24. The difficulty with this pronouncement is defining exactly what adverse interests
require the establishment of appropriate subclasses. For example, section H of the Set-
tlement adopts the pro tanto method of calculating set-offs and contributions rights in
all Manville-related litigation. See supra note 163. While some codefendants may not be
prejudiced by that provision, other members of the subclass, specifically those entitled
under state law to using the pro rata or equitable share method to calculate set-offs,
certainly will be. See supra note 163. Thus, codefendants whose rights are not being
compromised may favor the adoption of the pro tanto method, while other codefendants
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asbestos class actions and then failing to identify adequately
when such treatment is appropriate, the Second Circuit has only
further impeded the full and efficient use of mandatory class ac-
tions in the mass tort context.
The Second Circuit also refused to address one of the most
pressing problems presented by the Manville case, namely the
lack of any single uniform law applicable to all the parties. 350
While the validity of section H of the Settlement had been
raised on appeal, the court expressly declined to decide whether
that provision unlawfully impaired the parties' state law rights
by imposing uniform rules on the Manville class. ' 11 Accordingly,
it is still unclear whether courts may use either a single state's
law or federal common law to facilitate the use of limited fund
class actions in asbestos litigation.0 2 Without such a determina-
tion, courts will continue to confront extensive, and in some
cases impossible, conflicts of law problems similar to those en-
countered by the trial courts in Manville.3 3 Moreover, asbestos
class actions will continue to present the courts with a crazy
may contest it. Unfortunately, the Second Circuit has failed to provide any guidance as
to whether such a conflict of interest would require the creation of additional subclasses
among the codefendants.
m In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at *20.
By failing to do so, the Second Circuit called into question the validity of the uniform
provisions contained in section H of the Manville Settlement. See supra notes 156-64
and accompanying text.
The appellate court could have established a single uniform law applicable to all the
class members in two ways. First, the Second Circuit could have undertahen an extensive
conflict of laws analysis to determine if a single state's law could law;fully be applied to
all the litigants. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text. In addition, the court
could have avoided this complex procedural step by simply adopting federal common law
for all asbestos class actions, a course of action advocated by this Comment. See supra
notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
Instead, the Second Circuit ignored this crucial issue and provided absolutely no
guidance to the trial courts as to what law to apply on remand. Ironically, the Second
Circuit did "caution" the trial courts against merely interpreting the provisions of sec-
tion H of the Settlement instead of spelling them out in operative terms. In re Joint
Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at "20. Such a step, how-
ever, is impossible without first determining which law applies to the case. Thus, the
Second Circuit criticized the trial courts for failing to resolve the applicable law isue,
even though the appellate court had declined to take any steps to accomplish that very
same goal on appeal!
Id. at *20.
Z See supra notes 264-72 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the possible
bases justifying the imposition of federal common law in the asbestos context, see supra
notes 284-302 and accompanying text.
"33 See supra notes 264-72 and accompanying text.
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patchwork of applicable law, with class members having differ-
ent substantive rights depending upon the state in which their
claim originated. By not adequately addressing this crucial issue,
the Second Circuit missed an excellent opportunity to clarify or
perhaps even solve the applicable law dilemma in mass tort
litigation.
The ultimate losers in the Second Circuit's decision were
neither judges, court-appointed experts nor legal commentators;
the ultimate losers in Manville are the parties to the litigation
itself. The Manville proceedings continue to defy resolution. It
has been ten years since the Johns-Manville Corporation filed
for bankruptcy.35 ' It has been over two years since the AH Trust
has made any substantial payments to claimants 0 5 For ten
months, the parties have awaited the Second Circuit's deci-
sion. 58 Unfortunately, that opinion only foreshadows further de-
lays as the trial courts struggle to understand and implement
the Second Circuit's mandate.
It is obvious that the law must change and adapt to deal
effectively with the asbestos crisis. The Second Circuit's ap-
proval of a limited fund class action in Manville is an important
first step in accomplishing that transformation. Ultimately, how-
ever, the Second Circuit's imposition of subclasses and its fail-
ure, as well as that of the district court, to apply federal com-
mon law, ignores the judiciary's obligation to fashion an
equitable solution to the asbestos crisis.
The Johns-Manville Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection on August 26,
1982. In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at *1.
3" Judge Weinstein stayed all payments by the AH Trust as of July 9, 1990. Id. at
*3. That stay was reaffirmed by Judge Weinstein following the Second Circuit's vacatur
of the Manville Settlement. See In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig.,
No. 90-3973, slip op. at 3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1992) (on file at Brooklyn Law Review).
356 The trial courts approved the Manville settlement on June 27, 1991. In re Joint
Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 1992 WL 356781, at *6. The appeal was
argued before the Second Circuit on February 4, 1992. Id. at 356781. The appellate
court, however, did not issue its opinion until December 4, 1992, some ten months later.
Id.
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